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Abstract 
Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD[AT&L]), and Robert F. Hale, Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer), issued a Joint memorandum on April 22, 2011, 
titled Joint memorandum on Saving Related to “Should-Cost.”  As iterated in the 
memorandum, Dr. Carter’s goal for the should-cost initiative is to ensure that 
program managers (PMs) drive productivity improvements into their programs during 
contract negotiations and throughout program execution and sustainment.  This is 
achievable, according to Dr. Carter, if PMs continuously perform should-cost 
analysis that scrutinizes every element of government and contractor cost.  
In addition to the Joint memorandum, Dr. Carter issued a second 
memorandum on April 22, 2011, for acquisition and logistics professionals, titled 
Implementation of Will-Cost and Should-Cost Management.  This guidance is 
applicable for all acquisition category (ACAT) I, II, and III programs.   
The purpose of this research is to examine the potential impacts this and 
related directives have on the contracting community’s ability to request, acquire, 
audit, and utilize data germane to contract negotiations and management and 
whether there may be inherent potential conflicts with the commercial item 
acquisition provisions of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 12 and the 
contract pricing initiatives of FAR Part 15 to reduce reliance on the Truth in 
Negotiations Act (TINA) requirements for certified cost and pricing data and cost 
accounting standards (CAS), and explore strategies for implementing the directive 
effectively.  Additionally, the research will determine the nature and extent of any 
potential impacts on the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and 
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I. Introduction and Objective 
A. Research Purpose and Objective 
In response to skyrocketing program, acquisition, and contract cost on major 
weapons systems, Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics; USD[AT&L]), and Robert F. Hale, Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer), issued a Joint memorandum on April 
22, 2011, titled Joint memorandum on Savings Related to “Should-Cost.”  As 
iterated in the memorandum, Dr. Carter’s goal for the should-cost initiative is to 
ensure that program managers (PMs)_drive productivity improvements into their 
programs during contract negotiations and throughout program execution and 
sustainment.  This is achievable, according to Dr. Carter, if PMs continually perform 
should-cost analysis that scrutinizes every element of government and contractor 
cost.  
In addition to the Joint memorandum, Dr. Carter issued a second 
memorandum on April 22, 2011, for acquisition and logistics professionals, titled 
Implementation of Will-Cost and Should-Cost Management.  This guidance is 
applicable for all acquisition category (ACAT) I, II, and III programs.   
The objective of this research is to examine the potential impacts this and 
related directives have on the contracting community’s ability to request, acquire, 
audit, and utilize data germane to contract negotiations and management and 
whether there may be inherent potential conflicts with commercial item acquisition 
provisions of FAR Part 12, and Contract Pricing FAR Part 15 initiatives to reduce 
reliance on the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) requirements for certified cost and 
pricing data and cost accounting standards (CAS), and explore strategies for 
implementing the directive effectively.  Additionally, the research will determine the 
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Agency (DCMA) and Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) at supporting the 
should-cost effort as iterated. 
It is my belief that this work will add value to the current body of work 
designed to create a culture of efficiency and effectiveness in Department of 
Defense (DoD) procurement and contracting and provide a highly referenced and 
readable work useful for policy-makers, practitioners, and academics.  
B. Research Questions 
The primary research questions addressed in this paper are as follows: 
 What specific impact does Ashton Carter’s should-cost directive have 
on DoD contracting as related to protocols for acquiring commercial 
items?  
 What are the data requirement provisions under protocols for acquiring 
commercial items versus non-protocols for acquiring commercial 
items?  
 Is the should-cost requirement approach, as defined in the 
memorandum, achievable under the commercial item acquisition 
provisions of the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) and the 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA), or does the 
memorandum call for another acquisition strategy using non-protocols 
for acquiring commercial items? 
 If the should-cost memorandum mandates are to be achieved, what 
specific actions and strategies must be taken by contracting offices to 
support the mandate? 
 Are the DCMA and DCAA able to fully support this initiative, and what 
specific actions must they take?  
 What specific findings and recommendations can be proffered to 
effectively implement the should-cost initiatives?   
C. Methodology and Scope 
This research includes a thorough literature review, examination and 
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integral to the should-cost will-cost initiative.  Specific sources include, but are not 
limited to, the following:  
 General Accountability Office (GAO) reports and testimony, 
 existing and ongoing research efforts at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS), 
 professional information sources from major systems PM and 
contracting activities, 
 academic literature, and 
 SMEs within the DoD and other organizations.  
Whenever SMEs are utilized, the DoD and NPS mandate that Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) protocols are followed to ensure SMEs are given full notification 
of a researcher’s intent to use information gathered from them for research 
purposes. In accordance with these policies, I obtained consent from all SMEs that I 
consulted as part of my research for this published work.  
Based on the information obtained through this research, I make conclusions 
and recommendations to professionals desiring a better understanding of the 
implementation of Ashton Carter’s should-cost will-cost initiative, address concerns 
over potential conflicts with the FARA and FASA, and identify how the DoD may be 
best structured for achieving the greatest efficiencies and effectiveness at 
implementation.  
D. Section Conclusion 
The following section presents an overview of should-cost will-cost, its 
historical roots, and the Ashton Carter initiative.  In Section III, I examine the FASA, 
the FARA, and the TINA, since a premise of this work is to determine possible 
conflicts with the implementation of should-cost will-cost and those acts.  In Section 
IV, I examine should-cost will-cost implementation and potential barriers, along with 
the DoD’s structural capability—in terms of personnel, platforms, and protocols—to 
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II. Should-Cost Will-Cost Overview 
A. Should-Cost and Will-Cost Defined 
The definitions if should-cost and will-cost are necessary for an understanding 
of the concepts and applicability.   
1. Will-cost is defined as what a program weapons system is likely to cost 
given a non-advocate (independent) cost estimate, such as in an 
independent cost estimate (ICE) or independent government estimate 
(IGE), based primarily on historical cost incurred.   
2. Should-cost is defined as the program weapons system cost adjusted 
for the program’s initiatives or opportunities to reduce cost below the 
ICE level.  
The main difference between will-cost and should-cost is the extensive use of 
historically incurred cost for will-cost estimates versus the examination of forward-
looking efforts at reducing cost in operations and manufacturing utilized in 
developing should-cost estimates.   
B. Should-Cost and Will-Cost History 
Should-cost will-cost is not a new concept.  As early as the mid-1950s, 
should-cost analysis was proposed as a means to get better, more accurate 
estimates on what systems ought to cost, versus what they will cost based on 
historical data that may have included numerous inefficiencies in production and 
management.   
According to Nick Schwellenbach (2011), director of investigations at the 
Project on Government Oversight (POGO), in some ways, the should-cost and will-
cost prongs seem contradictory, but if implemented correctly and in concert, they 
should save money—or at least lead to better managed programs. One of the 
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industrial engineer Ernest Fitzgerald, a now-retired Air Force acquisition official who 
was an ardent proponent of should-cost analysis beginning in the 1950s until his 
retirement in the mid-1960s.   
Major David N. Burt, a well-recognized name in many contracting and 
acquisition professional circles, published an article in the September-October 1972 
Air University Review titled “Should Cost, A Multimillion-Dollar Savings,” in which he 
describes should-cost as “a procedure used to determine what a system ought to 
cost, assuming reasonably attainable economy and efficiency in the contractor’s 
operation.  It differs from traditional pricing methods in two ways: the depth of 
analysis and the purposeful challenging of inefficiencies in the contractor’s 
operation.” Burt explains that the Air Force needed a comprehensive analysis on 
contractors’ systems to lower cost through improving contractor performance in 
organization and management, engineering, contract management, production and 
quality control, logistics, and materiel management.  In the 1960s, the Air Force 
established teams of eight to 10 credentialed evaluators to examine contractor 
processes and management.  These reviews were initially called industrial 
management surveys and later called program management evaluations—the 
precursor of today’s milestone reviews.  During these evaluations, the Armed 
Services Procurement Manual (ASPM)—the precursor of the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR)—stipulated that cost analysis should examine all cost for their (1) 
necessity, (2) reasonableness, (3) allowances for contingencies (uncertainties), (4) 
basis used to allocate overhead cost, and (5) appropriateness of allocations of 
overhead cost to the proposed contract (Burt, 1972).   
In June 1972, the United States Army, under the Army’s SAFEGUARD 
system office, published an extensive work titled Should Cost/Will Cost/Must Cost—
A Theory on the Cause of Cost Growth.  In this work, the Army describes the unique 
effect of limited competition among major weapons suppliers and a single buyer 
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POGO founder Dina Rasor closely collaborated with Fitzgerald in the POGO’s 
early years in the 1980s, when the POGO was known as the Project on Military 
Procurement. The essence of should-cost is what work should cost after the fat is 
squeezed out, as Fitzgerald put it in his 1989 book, The Pentagonists. DoD had 
embraced the term should-cost but not the substance of the hard-nosed, on-the-floor 
analysis of contractor cost that he recommended (Rasor, 2011).  
C. Should-Cost Will-Cost: The Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) 
The FAR, along with its associated implementing and supporting FAR 
supplements such as the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS) and the Air Force Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS), currently 
include the should-cost concept and initiative, which first appeared officially in the 
ASPM 
Specifically, FAR 15.407-4 currently states the following (I have left the 
original FAR part, section, and subsection numbering and punctuation intact).  
5.407-4 -- Should-Cost Review 
(a) General. 
(1) Should-cost reviews are a specialized form of cost analysis. 
Should-cost reviews differ from traditional evaluation methods 
because they do not assume that a contractor’s historical costs 
reflect efficient and economical operation. Instead, these reviews 
evaluate the economy and efficiency of the contractor’s existing work 
force, methods, materials, equipment, real property, operating 
systems, and management. These reviews are accomplished by a 
multi-functional team of Government contracting, contract 
administration, pricing, audit, and engineering representatives. The 
objective of should-cost reviews is to promote both short and long-





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 8 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
order to reduce the cost of performance of Government contracts. In 
addition, by providing rationale for any recommendations and 
quantifying their impact on cost, the Government will be better able to 
develop realistic objectives for negotiation. 
(2) There are two types of should-cost reviews -- program should-
cost review (see paragraph (b) of this subsection) and overhead 
should-cost review (see paragraph (c) of this subsection) 
(3) These should-cost reviews may be performed together or 
independently.  
(b) Program should-cost review.  
(1) A program should-cost review is used to evaluate significant 
elements of direct costs, such as material and labor, and associate indirect 
costs, usually associated with the production of major weapons systems.  
(2) A program should-cost review should be considered, particularly in 
the case of a major system acquisition, when,  
(i) Some initial production has already taken place;  
(ii) The contract will be awarded on a sole source basis;  
(iii) There are future year production requirements for substantial 
items of like items;  
 (iv) The items being acquired have a history of increasing costs;  
(v) The work is sufficiently defined to permit an effective analysis 
and major changes are unlikely;  
(vi) Sufficient time is available to plan and adequately conduct 
the should-cost review, and;  
(vii) Personnel with the required skills are available or can be 
assigned for the duration of the should cost review.” 
For the sake of brevity, I have provided only pertinent excerpts of FAR 
15.407-4 in this section (see Appendix A for the complete FAR 15.407-4 Should-
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D. Should-Cost in Today’s Environments  
1. Shrinking Budgets 
Since 2007, Congress and the DoD have placed increasing emphasis on cost 
reductions in military spending.  Current projections for military spending may not be 
sustainable according to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections.  In the July 
2012 edition of its publication Long-Term Implications of the 2013 Future Years 
Defense Program (FYDP; subsequently “2013 FYDP”), the CBO projected potential 
shortfalls in funding for programs and sustainability, notwithstanding the cost of 
overseas contingency operations (OCO).  Figure 1 depicts current estimates in the 
2013 FYDP, with projections out to 2030.  
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Under current CBO projections, the cost for the DoD’s plans exceed the 
funding that the DoD can receive through 2021 under the caps established by the 
Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 (Public Law 122-25).  Even without the potential 
advent of the BCA caps, which are currently scheduled for January 2013, funding for 
the DoD during 2012–2021 is about $80 billion less than inflation projections.  With 
the BCA caps, the reduction in DoD budgets will be approximately $55 billion per 
year over the 2013–2021 period, totaling $589 billion in reductions for that nine-year 
period (CBO, 2012).  
2. Escalating Cost 
Despite economic and political factors negatively impacting FYDP budgets, 
acquisition program cost continues to escalate.  According to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), the total estimated cost of the DoD’s 2011 portfolio of 
96 major defense acquisition programs stands at $1.58 trillion.  In the past year, the 
total acquisition cost of these programs has grown by over $74.4 billion, or 5%, of 
which, according to the GAO, approximately $31.1 billion is attributed to factors such 
as inefficiencies in production, $29.6 billion is attributed to quantity changes, and 
$13.7 billion is attributed to research and development cost growth.  The majority of 
programs in the portfolio have lost buying power because unit cost have increased 
(GAO, 2012).  Figure 2 presents the allocation of major defense acquisition program 
(MDAP) cost growth in 2011.  Of particular interest is the growth in cost due to 
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III. Ashton Carter’s Initiative   
The Ashton Carter should-cost initiative was promulgated through a series of 
memoranda issued between June 2010 and August 2011 as well as through 
associated implementation directives issued by the Navy, Air Force, and Army.  The 
following section provides an overview of the should-cost initiative, as iterated in the 
memoranda; the information here is condensed to reflect a concise demonstration of 
germane elements. Ashton Carter’s memoranda reviewed in this section are 
presented in their entirety as Appendices B through G.   
A. Better Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability 
and Productivity in Defense Spending (June 2010) 
On June 28, 2010, Ashton Carter issued the first in a series of memoranda 
mandating affordability and efficiency in DoD spending.  The memorandum for 
acquisition professionals, titled Better Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring 
Affordability and Productivity in Defense Spending, laid the foundation for all 
subsequent memoranda issued over the next 15 months.  In this memorandum, Dr. 
Carter called for “delivering better value to the taxpayer and improving the way the 
Department does business. … We must abandon inefficient practices accumulated 
in a period of budget growth and learn to manage defense dollars in a manner that 
is, to quote Secretary Gates at his May 8, 2010 speech at the Eisenhower Library, 
‘respectful of the American taxpayer at a time of economic and fiscal distress’” 
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B. Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater 
Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending and 
Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power—
Restoring Affordability and Productivity in Defense 
Spending (September 2010) 
Ashton Carter subsequently issued two memoranda, again while acting as 
USD(AT&L); both memoranda were dated and released on September 14, 2010.  
The first memorandum is titled Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater 
Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending (Carter, 2010b) and the second is 
titled Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power—Restoring Affordability and 
Productivity in Defense Spending (Carter, 2010c; see Appendix C and D, 
respectively, for the complete memoranda). 
The memorandum Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power—
Restoring Affordability and Productivity in Defense Spending (Carter, 2010c) 
requested the Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) to 
develop the protocols and manpower required to implement the overarching 
initiatives in the Better Buying Power memorandums.  This request included 
incorporation and integration of key agencies in the protocol and manpower reviews, 
including the DCMA and the DCAA.  An excerpt from this memorandum states, 
Work with the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the Defense 
Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to develop guidance which will clearly 
spell out the roles and responsibilities of each organization in those areas 
where duplication and overlap occur.  Provide recommended guidance to me 
and to the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) by December 1, 2010.  
By October 1, 2010, you are to task DCMA to be responsible for the 
promulgation of all Forward Pricing Rate Recommendations. In those cases, 
where DCAA has completed an audit of a particular contractor’s rates, DCMA 
shall adopt the DCAA recommended rates as the Department’s position with 
regards to those.” (Carter, 2010c)  
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To put it bluntly: we have a continuing responsibility to procure the critical 
goods and services our forces need in the years ahead, but we will not have 
ever-increasing budgets to pay for them. We must therefore strive to achieve 
what economists call productivity growth: in simple terms, to DO MORE 
WITHOUT MORE. (Carter, 2010c). 
Acting on Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ call for obtaining greater 
efficiencies in DoD procurements, Dr. Carter worked with senior leaders in the 
acquisition community—including the component acquisition executives (CAEs), 
senior logisticians and systems command leaders, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD), program executive officers (PEOs), and PMs—to create the Better 
Buying Power initiatives and guidance. The guidance potentially affected $400 billion 
of the $700 billion DoD budget spent on goods and services ($200 billion each for 
weapons, electronics, fuel, etc., and $200 billion for information technology [IT] 
support.)  Secretary Gates and Dr. Carter estimated the potential savings from the 
initiatives and guidance as a significant element of the targeted $100 billion from 
unproductive to more productive purposes over the five-year period from 2011–
2015.   
Within the USD(AT&L) guidance memorandum, should-cost protocol was 
addressed as a means to reduce unproductive overhead within supporting 
contractors and to capture reductions in contracts by informing future price and 
contract-type negotiations (Carter, 2010b).  The following is an excerpt from Dr. 
Carter’s September 14, 2010, Better Buying Power memorandum:  
During contract negotiation and program execution, our managers should be 
driving productivity improvement in their programs. They should be 
scrutinizing every element of program cost, assessing whether each element 
can be reduced relative to the year before, challenging learning curves, 
dissecting overheads and indirect costs, and targeting cost reduction with 
profit incentive—in short, executing to what the program should cost. The 
Department’s decision makers and Congress use independent cost estimates 
(ICE)—forecasts of what a program will cost based upon reasonable 
extrapolations from historical experience—to support budgeting and 
programming. While ICE Will Cost analysis is valuable and credible, it does 
not help the program manager to drive leanness into the program. In fact, just 
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past programs, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The forecast budget is 
expected, even required, to be fully obligated and expended. 
To interrupt this vicious cycle and give program managers and contracting 
officers and their industry counterparts a tool to drive productivity 
improvement into programs, I will require the manager of each major program 
to conduct a Should Cost analysis justifying each element of program cost 
and showing how it is improving year by year or meeting other relevant 
benchmarks for value. Meanwhile, the Department will continue to set the 
program budget baseline (used also in ADMs and Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SARs)) using an ICE. We will use this method, for example, to drive 
cost down in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the Department’s largest 
program and the backbone of tactical air power for the U.S. and many other 
countries in the future. This aircraft’s ICE (Will Cost) average unit price grew 
from $50 million Average Unit Procurement Cost (APUC) when the program 
began (in 2002 dollars, when the program was baselined) to $92 million in the 
most recent ICE. Accordingly, the JSF program had a Nunn-McCurdy breach 
last year and had to be restructured by the Secretary of Defense. As a result 
of that restructuring, a Should Cost analysis is being done in association with 
the negotiation of the early lot production contracts. The Department is 
scrubbing costs with the aim of identifying unneeded cost and rewarding its 
elimination over time. The result should be a negotiated price substantially 
lower than the Will Cost ICE to which the Department has forecasted and 
budgeted. Secretary Gates indicated in his Efficiency Initiative that monies 
saved in this way could be retained by the Service that achieved the 
efficiency; in this case the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps could reallocate 
JSF funds to buy other capabilities. 
The Department will obligate about $2 trillion in contracts over the next 
five years according to Will Cost estimates, so savings of a few percent per 
year in execution are significant. 
The metric of success for Should Cost management leading to annual 
productivity increases is annual savings of a few percent from all our ongoing 
contracted activities as they execute to a lower figure than budgeted. Industry 
can succeed in this environment because we will tie better performance to 
higher profit, and because affordable programs will not face cancellation. 
(Carter, 2010b, pp. 3–4) 
This excerpt, on close examination, promoted a forward-looking analysis of 
contractors’ embedded practices and associated cost for production as the should-
cost position on which PMs must focus, rather than on the initial and/or existing will-
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C. Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power—
Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense 
Spending (November 2010) 
Dr. Carter’s seven-page November 3, 2010, memorandum titled 
Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power—Obtaining Greater Efficiency and 
Productivity in Defense Spending reiterated guidance provided in prior memoranda 
(see Subsections B and C of Section III) and specified actions that the secretaries of 
the military departments and directors of defense agencies should execute 
immediately or in the time frame specified within the memorandum.  The 
memorandum also stated that additional actions in support of the initiatives proffered 
in the memoranda dated September 14, 2010, will be developed over the following 
weeks and months.  The memorandum addressed five specific areas from the 
September 14, 2010, memoranda: (1) targeting affordability and controlling cost 
growth, (2) incentivizing productivity and innovation in industry, (3) promoting real 
competition, (4) improving tradecraft in service acquisition, and (5) reducing non-
productive processes and bureaucracy.   
I have provided the November 3, 2010, memorandum in its entirety as 
Appendix E. Will-cost and should-cost are specifically addressed in the following 
excerpt from Dr. Carter’s memorandum:  
Effective November 15, 2010, you will establish "Should Cost" targets as 
management tools for all ACAT I programs as they are considered for major 
MS decisions. As described in my September 14, 2010, Guidance to the 
acquisition workforce, "Should Cost" targets will be developed using sound 
estimating techniques that are based on bottom-up assessments of what 
programs should cost, if reasonable efficiency and productivity enhancing 
efforts are undertaken. 
These costs will be used as a basis for contract negotiations and contract 
incentives and to track contractor and program executive officer/project 
manager performance. Program performance against "Should Cost" 
estimates will be reported to the Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis 
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By January 1, 2011, you will establish "Should Cost" estimates for ACAT II 
and III programs as they are considered for component MS decisions. You 
will use "Should Cost"-based management to track performance of ACAT II 
and III programs. (Carter, 2010c) 
Dr. Carter further invoked the should-cost initiative in addressing poor 
tradecraft in services acquisitions, stating,  
 I will issue further detailed guidance for establishing taxonomy of preferred 
contract types in services acquisition, but starting immediately, you will 
ensure that services acquisitions under your control are predisposed toward 
Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) or Cost-Plus-Incentive Fee (CPIF) 
arrangements when robust competition or recent competitive pricing history 
does not exist. This practice will be used to build sufficient cost knowledge of 
those services within that market segment. You will employ that cost 
knowledge to inform the "Should Cost" estimates of future price and contract 
type negotiations. When robust competition already exists, or there is recent 
competitive pricing history, you will ensure that services acquisitions under 
your control are predisposed toward Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) type contract 
arrangements. FFP should also be used to the maximum extent reasonable 
when ongoing competition is used in Multiple Award Contract scenarios. 
(Carter, 2010c). 
In the preceding context, Dr. Carter wanted to build a knowledge base of cost 
within particular service segments where true competition is not driving the prices 
paid.  This can only be accomplished through contract vehicles that allow for 
detailed submission of cost estimates in discussions and negotiations and for 
utilization of that data to support future contract negotiations.  Hence Dr. Carter’s 
predisposition for cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) and cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) 
contract arrangements in non-competitive circumstances.  
D. Implementation of Will-Cost and Should-Cost Management 
(April 2011) 
Dr. Carter’s April 22, 2011, memorandum, Implementation of Will-Cost and 
Should-Cost Management, was addressed to acquisition and logistics professionals 
and issued the clearest guidance on should-cost and what the initiative embodies 
and the responsibilities for conduct among the Services and agencies (see Appendix 
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cost initiative is to ensure that PMs drive productivity improvements into their 
programs during contract negotiations and throughout program execution, including 
sustainment.  This means eliminating cost overruns and delivering programs below 
budget baselines that are independently established in the will-cost estimates.  PMs 
are to continuously perform should-cost analyses that scrutinize every element of 
government and contractor cost.  Not only are PMs to focus on cutting contractor 
inefficiency but also on inefficiency within the DoD.  Will-cost estimates will continue 
to be utilized as the official position for acquisition program baselines or to set 
budgets for the budgeting, programming, and reports promulgated externally to the 
DoD.  
Any savings generated from the initiative links PMs’ and PEOs’ performance 
evaluations to results of the initiative.  Additionally, savings generated are to be 
shared between the contractor and government, with appropriate recognition for 
employees in both arenas that delivered the improvements.   
Service and component acquisition executives (S/CAEs), PEOs, and PMs are 
tasked to weigh the best method of meeting the should-cost initiative.  The should-
cost estimates can be developed using any of three methods or combinations of the 
three.  Specifically, the first method is through a “bottoms-up” estimate, which 
includes a detailed examination of all cost and associated driving processes.  The 
second method is to identify specific reductions from the will-cost estimates.  Since 
the will-cost estimate is developed independently of the DoD stakeholders—
specifically the PEOs and PMs—any purposeful inflation of the will-cost baseline by 
PMs to create a should-cost savings is avoided.  The third method is use of 
competitive contracting, where warranted, and contract negotiation is utilized to 
identify should-cost savings.  Table 1 summarizes the three primary methodologies 
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Table 1. Dr. Carter’s Recommended Methodologies for Should-Cost Estimates 
(Yoder, 2012) 
 Estimate Methodology  Methodology Highlights  
1. Bottoms-up methodology  Cross-functional teams examine 
all processes and associated 
cost  
 May use lean-six protocols 
2. Will-cost estimate reductions  Create actionable items or 
targets for reduction 
 Estimate and track with should-
cost progress reports 
 Must not be arbitrary but 
substantiated through analysis 
 Must be consistent with the 
program of record (or presented 
in separate excursions to the 
Milestone Decision Authority 
(MDA) 
3. Competitive contracting and contract 
negotiations 
 Identify savings through sound 
contract business practices 
 Create share savings in contract 
structure 
 Utilize incentive contracts to 
entice participant savings 
 Negotiate fixed-price contracts 
that reflect should-cost 
estimates 
 
This memorandum included two attachments: the first was “Ingredients of 
Should Cost Management” (subsequently “Ingredients”), and the second was “Will-
Cost and Should-Cost Management Example Programs” (subsequently “Example 
Program”; Carter, 2011b).  The “Ingredients” attachment provided a clear and 
concise list of 10 management practices that may be applicable for PMs as well as 
management practices and contracting activities to incorporate into business 
practice.  Specifically, the list provided the following recommendations: 
1. Scrutinize each contributing ingredient of program cost and justify it. 
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2. Particularly challenge the basis for indirect cost in contractor 
proposals. 
3. Track recent program cost, cost, schedule, and performance trends 
and identify ways to reverse negative trend(s).  
4. Benchmark against similar DoD programs and commercial analogues 
(where possible), and against other programs performed by the same 
contractor or in the same facilities.  
5. Promote Supply Chain Management to encourage competition and 
incentivize cost performance at lower tiers.  
6. Reconstruct the program (government and contractor) team to be more 
streamlined and efficient.  
7. Identify opportunities to breakout Government-Furnished Equipment 
versus prime contractor-provided items.  
8. Identify items or services contracted through a second or third party 
vehicle.  Eliminate unnecessary pass-through costs by considering 
other contracting options.  
9. In the area of test: 
a.  Take full advantage of integrated Development and 
Operational Testing to reduce overall cost of testing;  
b.  Integrate modeling and simulation into the test construct 
to reduce overall costs and ensure optimal use of 
National test facilities and ranges. 
10. Identify an alternative technology/material that can potentially reduce 
development of life cycle costs for a program.  Ensure the prime 
contract includes the development of this technology/material at the 
right time. (Carter, 2011b) 
The memorandum’s “Example Programs” attachment identified five target 
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Table 2. Will-Cost and Should-Cost Management Example Programs 
 
Air Force Army Navy 
Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) Joint Air Ground Missile 
(JAGM) 
Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) 
Global Hawk Blocks 30 & 
40 (GH BLK 30 & 40) 
Black Hawk (UH-60M) Hawkeye (E-2D) 
Space Based Infrared 
System (SBIRS) 
Ground Combat Vehicle 
(GCV) 
Presidential Helo (VXX) 
Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle (EELV) 
Paladin Product 
Improvement (PIM) 
Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS) 
Advanced Extremely 
High Frequency (AEHF) 
Satellite System 
NETT Warrior Ohio Replacement 
Program 
Note. The information in this table was adapted from Dr. Carter’s April 22, 2011, memorandum. 
Note that technically, this table represents 14 total programs since the Air 
Force and Navy share the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) program.  
E. Should-Cost and Affordability (August 2011) 
Dr. Carter’s August 24, 2011, memorandum, Should-Cost and Affordability, is 
provided in its entirety as Appendix G.  This memorandum was issued to quell 
confusion among PMs wrestling with key issues during early implementation of 
Better Buying Power and should-cost initiatives on programs prior to Milestone B.  
Confusion existed regarding two elements of Better Buying Power memoranda 
(Carter, 2010a, 2010b): specifically, definitions of the terms affordability as a 
requirement and should-cost and applicability of specific should-cost mandates 
within early program milestones, prior to engineering and manufacturing 
development (EMD) and production.    
Dr. Carter addressed the issue by defining affordability as a requirement as 
the DoD’s goal for unit production cost and sustainment cost based on what DoD 
can pay.  These goals are set early and used to drive design trade-offs and choices 
about priorities.  The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) establishes the 
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captures the product’s expected capability against its expected (affordable) life cycle 
cost.   
Should-cost, according to the August 2011 memorandum, asks for something 
different than affordability as a requirement.  It calls for a continuous fight to lower all 
DoD cost, wherever that makes sense.  Should-cost focuses on the actual work 
being performed and uses information gathered to better inform negotiations and the 
ensuing structure of contract cost and incentives.  According to the memorandum,  
The should-cost approach challenges us to do our best to find specific ways 
to beat the Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) or Program Estimate (which 
should already reflect the affordability requirements) and other cost 
projections funded in our budgets (i.e., “will-cost”), when we find sensible 
opportunities to do so.  For example, should cost does not mean trading away 
the long-term value of sound design practices and discipline a engineering 
management for short-term gain; it does mean eliminating non-value added 
overhead and unnecessary reporting requirements.  Should-cost can be 
applied to anything that we do and to any source of costs, including cost for 
services and internal government costs as well as contracted product costs. 
Unlike affordability requirements, we do not expect them to always be 
achieved, by we do expect strong efforts to do so. (Carter, 2011c) 
Additionally, the memorandum recognized the potential conflict between 
affordability and should-cost early in programs.  As indicated, affordability is 
designed into the product, and early initiatives to reduce future cost can have a huge 
impact on cost reduction.  During initial stages of a program, when design choices 
are made, affordability constraints should be established to provide a guide for 
ultimate design.  During the early design processes, should-cost management can 
be utilized to reduce overhead and unproductive expenses.  The information 
gleaned from should-cost can also be utilized in examining initial low rate initial 
production (LRIP) prices during contract negotiations.  Once the requirements, 
design, and affordability goals are established and an ICE or program estimate 
exists, should-cost can then be utilized to challenge assumptions, perform additional 
analysis, formulate should-cost estimates for follow-on production and sustainment, 
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F. Service Implementation of Ashton Carter’s Initiative   
The Navy, Air Force, and Army took quick action to place Dr. Carter’s should-
cost initiative into practice.  All three Services issued implementation memoranda, in 
June and July 2011.  These memoranda clearly brought Dr. Carter’s should-cost 
initiative from a conceptual plan into a more implementable concept; providing many 
of the details and functional assignments required to bringing the concept into 
business practice.  I present highlights of the Service implementation mandates 
within the following narrative (see Appendix H (Navy), Appendix I (Air Force), and 
Appendix J (Army) for the complete memoranda).  
G. Implementation of Should-Cost Management - ASN (July 
2011) 
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and 
Acquisition (ASN[RD&A]) issued the memorandum Implementation of Should-Cost 
Management on July 19, 2011 (Stackley, 2011; see Appendix H for the entire 
memorandum).   
In summary, this memorandum directed the MDA to approve all should-cost 
management initiatives and targets and will use these to set program execution 
goals.  PMs are directed to manage, report, and track to these targets as well as 
defend the validity of the specific initiatives identified that achieve savings against 
the will-cost estimate.  For programs that report to the OSD, approval of should-cost 
management initiatives by the MDA is required prior to leaving Department of Navy 
(DoN) review.  Of note is that should-cost management reporting will not be external 
to the DoD.   
Program budget baselines will be informed by the will-cost estimate for all 
ACAT I, II, and III programs. During budget execution years, funds will be available 
to programs (PMs) based on their should-cost targets.  Successful execution to the 
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to the highest priority needs, initially limited to the five programs under the example 
programs F-35, E-2D, VXX, LCS, and Ohio Replacement programs.  
The Navy implementation memorandum contained an attachment 
promulgating should-cost management guidelines.  These guidelines included will-
cost and should-cost management, will-cost estimate (budget baseline) and 
development, should-cost management (program execution targets) and 
development, should-cost management reporting processes and procedures, 
reporting methods and templates, and withhold and release process details (for 
differences between the will-cost [budget] and should-cost estimates).  Additionally, 
the memorandum’s appendices included a section on opportunities for should-cost 
management, which expanded on the examples proffered in Dr. Carter’s 
memoranda.   
The section titled “Process for Withhold and Release of the Difference 
between the Will-Cost Estimate (budget) and the Should-Cost Management Target” 
required all differences between will-cost and should-cost estimates to be held at the 
secretariat level, with specific details for reporting, holding, and release, if applicable.    
H. Implementation of Will-Cost and Should-Cost Management 
- ASAF (June 2011) 
The Department of the Air Force issued the memorandum Implementation of 
Will-Cost and Should-Cost Management on June 15, 2011 (Morin & Van Buren, 
2011; see Appendix I for the entire memorandum)  This memorandum called for 
should-cost protocols to follow both the FAR and DFARS protocol to develop 
objectives for use in negotiating the immediate contract.  However, the Air Force 
further called for a broader interpretation, as Dr. Carter’s memoranda promoted, to 
include should-cost covering all government and contract program cost throughout 
the entire life cycle.  Will-cost estimates will be used for baseline budgeting and 
programming decisions and will be the metric for external reporting.  The should-cost 
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by the program offices, with cross-functional assistance, where warranted, from the 
Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA) or the DCMA.  The overarching theme is 
to drive leanness in all operations.  
The Air Force limited the initial should-cost will-cost implementation to five 
programs: Joint Strike Fighter (F-35), Global Hawk Blocks 30 & 40, Evolved 
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), and 
the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite System.   
Differences between will-cost and should-cost amounts are held at the 
Service level.  The Secretary of the Air Force Acquisition (SAF/AQ) and the 
Secretary of the Air Force Financial Management (SAF/FM) will jointly decide on 
distribution of funds, if and when appropriate.  
Main elements of this memorandum included will-cost and should-cost 
management, will-cost management baseline (budget baseline), should-cost 
management baseline, detailed guidance on will-cost estimate development, 
detailed guidance on should-cost estimate development, reporting procedures, 
waivers to provisions of the implementation plan, withhold and release process 
details (for differences between the will-cost and should-cost estimates), and 
templates for reporting.   
I. Army Implementation of Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) (USD (AT&L)) 
Affordability Initiatives Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(June 2011) 
The Department of the Army issued a memorandum titled Army 
Implementation of Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics) (USD (AT&L)) Affordability Initiatives on June 10, 2011 (Shyu, 2011; see  
Appendix J for the entire memorandum.)  This memorandum included all the Better 
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The Army mandates program offices to immediately implement the initiatives 
on ACAT I–III selected programs.  The will-cost serves as the baseline and is 
generated by a cost analysis independent cost estimate or a Department of the 
Army service cost position.  ACAT II and III programs are tasked to develop the rigor 
in estimating that is currently applied for ACAT I programs. The MDA will approve all 
initial should-cost estimates and use these estimates for program execution targets. 
The overarching theme is to drive leanness into all operations.  
The difference between the funds distributed and the program budget 
baseline will be withheld at the Service level for ACAT I and at the PEO for programs 
in which the PEO is the MDA. The MDA for ACAT I—and the PEO for those in which 
the PEO is the MDA—is the decision authority for distribution of any withheld funds 
determined for release to the programs.  
The memorandum contained templates for reporting along with enclosures for 
will-cost and should-cost estimating and management guidelines.  Main elements of 
the enclosure guidelines included will-cost and should-cost management, will-cost 
management baseline (budget baseline), should-cost management baseline 
(program execution baseline), detailed processes and procedures for will-cost and 
should-cost development, withhold and release process details (for differences 
between the will-cost and should-cost estimates), and reporting methods and 
templates.  
J.  Should-Cost Will-Cost Implementation Memoranda 
Summary  
The Services have implemented Dr. Carter’s should-cost initiative with striking 
similarities.  Table 3 is an examination of the implementation memoranda key 
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DCMA, and other 
PM offices.  
AFCAA or DCMA. Assistant 
Secretary for the 
Army Cost and 
Economics (DASA 
[CE]) and DCMA. 
Milestone A Will-cost estimate 
(initial or updated) 
should-cost 
management 
target (initial or 
update)  
Will-cost estimate 
(initial or updated) 
should-cost 
management 
target (initial or 
update) 
Will-cost estimate 
(initial or updated) 
should-cost 
management 
target (initial or 
update) 
Milestone B Will-cost update 
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IV. The Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) 
and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining 
Act (FASA): Impacts on Contracting 
A. FARA and FASA Background and History 
Acquisition reform initiatives—specifically, commercialization of business 
processes—and the 1990s decade of streamlining the acquisition workforce were all 
aimed at fundamentally improving the business of acquiring goods and services for 
federal agencies, including the DoD.  
The reforms towards commercial business practices commenced with the 
National Performance Review in 1993.  Initial efforts gained significant momentum 
during President Clinton’s administration and, more recently, with influential 
reformers such as Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense 
(AT&L), and then-Representative Tom Davis (R-VA), who chaired the Committee on 
Government Reform.  
Amidst all of the reforms and structural changes, there was a significant shift 
in the nature, or makeup, of what the federal government procures—from 
predominantly tangible goods and hardware to over a 50-50 mix of services to 
tangible goods and services, with many accounts placing the percentage of dollars 
in services at nearly 65% of the DoD’s total annual spend.  
The FASA of 1994 and the FARA of 1995 moved federal acquisition policies 
and procedures closer to commercial-industry standard.   
The same restructuring era of the 1990s and early 2000s, which was based 
on the anticipated benefits of reduced regulatory and administrative oversight 
requirements in federal contracting emanating from the FARA and FASA, also 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 34 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
the DCAA experienced personnel reductions of over 50% from levels prior to the 
FARA and FASA legislation.   
B. The FARA and FASA: Push for Greater Efficiency 
The FARA and FASA represented the beginning of the legislative acquisition 
reforms aimed at commercialization.  Prior to these legislative reforms, federal 
acquisitions were subject to myriad laws and regulations—compliance with which 
was mandatory for contractors participating in federal procurements.  The actual 
range and scope of applicable laws and regulations to a specific contract action was, 
and continues to be, based on the acquisition methodology, the type of contract 
vehicle, and the monetary amount of the acquisition, to name just a few of the 
primary drivers.  Prior to the FARA and FASA, the plethora of laws and regulations, 
including those incorporated in the FAR and the DFARS and specific agency and 
Service mandates and regulations, created a choke hold on contractors doing 
business with the federal government.  In addition to being a choke hold on 
businesses engaged in contracts with the federal government, these regulations 
acted as a solid barrier-to-entry for potential non-traditional commercial businesses 
that could offer much-needed commercial goods and services to the federal 
government.  Many potential businesses refused to conduct business with the 
federal government due to the imposition of legal, regulatory, and reporting 
requirements unique to federal contracting.   
Recognizing the dilemma emerging from traditional statutory and regulatory-
based constrictive business practices (and the impact these were having on 
potential and actual participants with the federal government), the DoD contracted a 
study of the negative impacts of federal and DoD acquisition mandates and 
oversight requirements on its existing and potential contractors.  In December 1994, 
Coopers and Lybrand issued a report  identifying over 120 regulatory and statutory 
cost drivers that, according to the study, increased the price that the DoD paid for 
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As an example relevant to this paper, the TINA resulted in a 1.3% premium 
paid by the government.  The TINA is normally applicable on negotiated contracts 
following FAR Part 15 protocols.   
The FARA and FASA eliminated over 120 statutes and regulations, most of 
which were identified in the Coopers and Lybrand study, that would otherwise be 
applicable on federal acquisitions.  The FARA and FASA created business protocols 
more like that which exist in commercial business arenas, and with the legislation 
came the advent of FAR Part 12, Acquisition of Commercial Items.  FAR 12.503, 
“Applicability of certain laws to Executive agency contracts for the acquisition of 
commercial items,” FAR 12.504, “Applicability of certain laws to subcontracts for the 
acquisition of commercial items,” and FAR 12.505, “Applicability of certain laws to 
contracts for the acquisition of COTS items,” specify laws and regulations that are 
not applicable on acquisitions under the protocols for acquiring commercial items 
outlined in FAR Part 12.   
C. FARA, FASA, and FAR 2.101 Definitions and FAR Part 12 
Protocols for Acquiring Commercial Items 
The FASA and FARA statutes mandated use of protocols for acquiring 
commercial items and created a broad definition of acquisition business criteria for 
those goods or services eligible for the streamlined FAR Part 12 commercial item 
acquisition protocols—the idea to reduce the complexities and cost-driving 
mandates on business. A clear understanding of the commercial item acquisition 
applicability, under defined mandates, is required to understand how the government 
protocols enable buyers to make “fair and reasonable” determinations, which are 
mandatory on each and every acquisition and contract, regardless of value.  FASA 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 36 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Table 4. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) Highlights 
(Yoder) 
Created preference for “commercial item” acquisition. 
Provided for utilization of “less intrusive” data sources in determining “fair and 
reasonable” pursuant to contract award; eliminated TINA requirements.  
Created a “broad” definition of commercial item to allow for maximum 
applicability of the legislative and regulatory relief under the provision.  
Created “best practice” business processes and protocols similar to commercial-
business-to-business standards.  
Maximized reliance on industry and market forces to establish “fair and 
reasonable” pricing.  
With popular support among business and acquisition community 
participants, additional legislation—the FARA—was passed shortly after the FASA.  
The FARA legislation expanded the definition of commercial item to include not only 
items “sold, leased, or licensed to the general public” but also those “offered for sale, 
lease, or license to the general public,” along with additional supporting definitions 
that are incorporated into FAR Part 12 definitions of commercial items.  Specific 
FARA highlights are provided in Table 5.   
Table 5.   Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) Highlights 
(Yoder) 
Expanded the definition of commercial item and its applicability to include the 
following: 
 items sold, leased, or licensed to the general public, 
 items offered for sale, lease, or license to the general public (these items 
may have zero prior sales history in the commercial or public market), 
 items that have evolved from commercial items, 
 Items that are commercial with modifications to meet government-unique 
requirements, 
 non-developmental items (NDI), which are items originally developed 
and/or sourced by a government agency, and 
 services at catalog or market price (defined by market analysis or 
competition). 
Prohibited the use of certified cost or pricing data under the TINA. 
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“Commercial item” means— (1) Any item, other than real property, 
that is of a type customarily used by the general public or by non-
governmental entities for purposes other than governmental purposes, 
and— 
(i) Has been sold, leased, or licensed to the general public; or 
(ii) Has been offered for sale, lease, or license to the general 
public; 
(2) Any item that evolved from an item described in paragraph (1) 
of this definition through advances in technology or performance and 
that is not yet available in the commercial marketplace, but will be 
available in the commercial marketplace in time to satisfy the delivery 
requirements under a Government solicitation; 
(3) Any item that would satisfy a criterion expressed in paragraphs 
(1) or (2) of this definition, but for— 
(i) Modifications of a type customarily available in the commercial 
marketplace; or 
(ii) Minor modifications of a type not customarily available in the 
commercial marketplace made to meet Federal Government 
requirements. Minor modifications means modifications that do not 
significantly alter the nongovernmental function or essential physical 
characteristics of an item or component, or change the purpose of a 
process. Factors to be considered in determining whether a 
modification is minor include the value and size of the modification and 
the comparative value and size of the final product. Dollar values and 
percentages may be used as guideposts, but are not conclusive 
evidence that a modification is minor; 
(4) Any combination of items meeting the requirements of 
paragraphs (1), (2), (3), or (5) of this definition that are of a type 
customarily combined and sold in combination to the general public; 
(5) Installation services, maintenance services, repair services, 
training services, and other services if— 
(i) Such services are procured for support of an item referred to in 
paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this definition, regardless of whether 
such services are provided by the same source or at the same time as 
the item; and 
(ii) The source of such services provides similar services 
contemporaneously to the general public under terms and conditions 
similar to those offered to the Federal Government; 
(6) Services of a type offered and sold competitively in substantial 
quantities in the commercial marketplace based on established catalog 
or market prices for specific tasks per- formed or specific outcomes to 
be achieved and under standard commercial terms and conditions. For 
purposes of these services— 
(i) “Catalog price” means a price included in a catalog, price list, 
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manufacturer or vendor, is either published or otherwise available for 
inspection by customers, and states prices at which sales are 
currently, or were last, made to a significant number of buyers 
constituting the general public; and 
(ii) “Market prices” means current prices that are established in the 
course of ordinary trade between buyers and sellers free to bargain 
and that can be substantiated through competition or from sources 
independent of the offerors. 
(7) Any item, combination of items, or service referred to in 
paragraphs (1) through (6) of this definition, notwithstanding the fact 
that the item, combination of items, or ser- vice is transferred between 
or among separate divisions, subsidiaries, or affiliates of a contractor; 
or (8) A non-developmental item, if the procuring agency determines 
the item was developed exclusively at private expense and sold in 
substantial quantities, on a competitive basis, to multiple State and 
local governments. 
“Commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS)” item— (1) Means 
any item of supply (including construction material) that is— (i) A 
commercial item (as defined in paragraph (1) of the definition in this 
section); (ii) Sold in substantial quantities in the commercial 
marketplace; and (iii) Offered to the Government, under a contract or 
subcontract at any tier, without modification, in the same form in which 
it is sold in the commercial marketplace; and (2) Does not include bulk 
cargo, as defined in section 3 of the Shipping Act of 1984 (46 U.S.C. 
App. 1702), such as agricultural products and petroleum products.  
(FAR, 2012) 
Key aspects of the FARA are (1) an elimination of over 120 statutes and 
regulations when using commercial item protocols, (2) a broad definition of what 
constitutes a commercial item for federal procurements, and (3) prohibition of TINA 
provisions.   
D. Determining “Fair and Reasonable”: Disengagement 
Emanating from the FARA, the FASA, and FAR Part 12  
The FARA, the FASA, and FAR Part 12 have revolutionized federal 
acquisition protocols.  In addition, they have eliminated over 120 statutes and 
regulations that were placing a choke hold on businesses, creating barriers-to-entry, 
and increasing the cost of all goods and services by over 18%. The DoD spent 
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contract award in the last 10 years.  Figure 3 shows the DoD contract spend for the 
20 years leading up to and including fiscal year (FY) 2010.   
 
Figure 3. DoD Contract Spending Trends (DoD Contract and Non-Contract) 
(Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 2011) 
The potential savings resulting from an 18% reduction through the FARA, the 
FASA, and FAR Part 12 is significant—totaling up to $540 billion in savings over a 
10-year period!    
However, despite the potential benefits, the commercial item protocols have 
resulted in disengagement in two key areas that are particularly germane to ACAT I, 
II, and III program-level contracts.  Disengagement is defined herein as the inability 
or unwillingness of the federal government to monitor and/or oversee the actions of 
contractors and subcontractors anticipating receipt of federally awarded contracts.  
The first aspect of disengagement is in fair and reasonableness determination 
leading up to and at the time of the contract award.  The determination of fair and 
reasonable is mandatory for all contract awards.  The warranted contracting officer’s 
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reasonableness was conducted, and the contracting officer must annotate the 
contracting file appropriately.  The most preferred method to determine fair and 
reasonable is through adequate competition.  The FAR prescribes favored 
techniques for making fair and reasonable determinations, listed in order of 
precedence from FAR 15.401:  
1. Price analysis is the process of examining and evaluating a 
proposed price without evaluating its separate cost elements and proposed 
profit.   
2. The Government may use various price analysis techniques and 
procedures to ensure a fair and reasonable price.  Examples of such 
techniques include, but are not limited to:  
i. Comparison of proposed prices received in response to the 
solicitation.  Normally, adequate price competition establishes price 
reasonableness (see FAR 15.403-1(c)(1)).  
ii. Comparison of previously-proposed prices, previous Government- 
and commercial contract prices with current proposed prices for the same or 
similar items, if both the validity of the comparison and the reasonableness of 
the previous price(s) can be established.  
iii. Use of parametric estimating methods/application of rough 
yardsticks (such as dollars per pound or per horsepower, or other units) to 
highlight significant inconsistencies that warrant additional pricing inquiry. 
iv. Comparison with competitive published price lists, published market 
prices of commodities, similar indexes, and discount or rebate arrangements. 
v. Comparison of proposed prices with independent Government cost 
estimates. 
vi. Comparison of proposed prices with prices obtained through market 
research for the same or similar items. 
vii. Analysis of pricing information provided by the offeror. 
Commercial-item designation under the FARA, the FASA, and FAR Part 12 
has one primary function or ideal. The basic idea behind commercial item acquisition 
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 The federal government is charged with maximizing the value of taxpayer 
dollars. In order to maximize value, the government generally seeks to award its 
contracts through competition. However, the government does not always buy truly 
commercial items that are sold in substantial quantities to the general public. 
Instead, and quite often, the government buys unique products and services to 
which there is no direct commercially available counterpart. The competitive market 
in which the federal government acquires its goods and services is diverse: from 
purely competitive and commercial competitors to oligopolistic or monopolistic 
contractors that match distinctive government requirements.  Figure 4 portrays the 
differences found in pure competitive commercial markets versus those found in 
markets associated with procurements most often associated with ACAT I, II, and III 
program contracts.  
 
Figure 4. Pure Competitive Commercial Markets Versus DoD-Unique Markets 
(Yoder, 2012) 
Federal contracts awarded above the simplified acquisition procedure (SAP) 
threshold, reported on the Contract Action Reporting System (CARS) and compiled 
in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) (both mandatory reports on 
contract actions), went to contractors that, generally speaking, did not offer bona fide 
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FY2011, fully $294.76 billion, representing 55.414% of awarded contract dollars, 
went to the top 100 defense contractors (as defined by the total dollar amount of 
awards; FPDS data extracted August 2012).  In addition, the top 10 defense 
contractors received $147.74 billion, representing 27.83%, of the total dollars 
expended.  Table 6 displays the top 10 companies by federal contract award dollars 
for FY2011.   
The majority of dollars being awarded by the DoD goes to “traditional” 
defense contractors. The dollars awarded to these firms were nearly evenly split 
between supplies (goods) and services; approximately 55% of the awards were 
spent on goods and 45% on services. These firms, for a majority of the products and 
services they offer, operate in quasi-competitive environments. Such arenas are 
characterized as oligopolistic or monopolistic markets.  
Table 6. Top 10 Companies by Federal Contract Award Dollars—FY2011 
(Derived from the FPDS, 2012) 
Company Name Dollar Total 2011 Percentage of Total 
1. Lockheed Martin $ 42,446,866, 959.53  7.9960% 
2. Boeing $ 21,599,245,643.25  4.0688% 
3. General Dynamics $ 19,442,764,028.59  3.6626% 
4. Northrop Grumman $ 15,020,080,455.00  2.8294% 
5. Raytheon  $ 14,771,086,834.84  2.7825% 
6. United Technologies $  7,908,114,454.95  1.4897% 
7. SAIC $  7,378,984,631.81  1.3900% 
8. L-3 Communications $  7,357,742,515.71  1.3860% 
9. BAE Systems PLC $  6,876,349,891.22  1.2954% 
10. Oshkosh  $  4,942,070,285.97  0.9310% 
Top Ten Summary $147,743,305,700.87  27.8316% 
 
E. Determining Fair and Reasonable—Disengagement 
Emanating from the FARA, the FASA, and FAR Part 12  
Quite simply, disengagement is defined as the inability or unwillingness of the 
government to interact with the market place using its sovereign capabilities, through 
legislation and regulation.  Disengagement from the FARA and FASA has many 
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negative manifestations for the government contracting officer is the elimination of 
the capability to invoke the TINA as it pertains to requesting and utilizing certified 
cost and pricing data, defined in FAR Part 15 and DFARS Part 215.  As discussed 
previously, commercial item designation under the provisions of the FARA and 
FASA may work well when competitive marketplaces, and full and open competition, 
drive the determination of fairness and reasonableness.  However, in many, if not 
most, cases in contracts associated with ACAT I through III programs, truly 
competitive forces do not exist.   
The DFARS helps alleviate the phenomenon of sole source or quasi-
competitive firms from declaring commercial item exemption from TINA provisions, 
thus helping to eliminate contracting officer dilemmas of using the lower-tier 
methodologies in determining fairness and reasonableness.  The DFARS 215-403 
series, titled “Obtaining certified cost or pricing data,” continues to list adequate 
competition as the primary means to alleviate the need to obtain certified cost or 
pricing data.  However, in the event that competitive forces are not adequate to 
determine whether a contract award is fair and reasonable the DFARS 215.371 
series applies.  The following excerpt is from the DFARS dated August 24, 2012. 
215.371-3 Fair and reasonable price. 
(a)  If there was “reasonable expectation …that two or more offerors, 
competing independently, would submit priced offers” but only one offer is 
received, this circumstance does not constitute adequate price competition 
unless an official at one level above the contracting officer approves the 
determination that the price is reasonable (see FAR 15.403-1(c)(1)(ii)). 
(b)  Except as provided in section 215.371-4(a), if only one offer is 
received when competitive procedures were used and the solicitation allowed 
at least 30 days for receipt of proposals (unless the 30-day requirement is not 
applicable in accordance with 215.371-4(b) or has been waived in 
accordance with section 215.371-5), the contracting officer shall— 
(1) Determine through cost or price analysis that the offered 
price is fair and reasonable and that adequate price competition exists (with 
approval of the determination at one level above the contracting officer) or 
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(see FAR 15.403-1(c) and 15.403-4). In these circumstances, no further cost 
or pricing data is required; or 
(2)(i)  Obtain from the offeror cost or pricing data necessary to 
determine a fair and reasonable price and comply with the requirement for 
certified cost or pricing data at FAR 15.403-4, in accordance with FAR 
provision 52.215-20. For acquisitions that exceed the cost or pricing data 
threshold, if no exception at FAR 15.403-1(c) applies, the cost or pricing data 
shall be certified; and  
(ii)  Enter into negotiations with the offeror as necessary 
to establish a fair and reasonable price. The negotiated price should not 
exceed the offered price. 
215.371-4  Exceptions.  
(a)(1)  The requirements at sections 215.371-2 and 215.371-3 do not 
apply to acquisitions— 
(i) At or below the simplified acquisition threshold; 
(ii) In support of contingency, humanitarian or peacekeeping 
operations, or to facilitate defense against or recovery from nuclear, 
biological, chemical, or radiological attack; or 
(iii) Of basic or applied research or development, as specified in 
FAR 35.016(a), that use a broad agency announcement. 
(2) The applicability of an exception in paragraph (a)(1) of this 
section does not eliminate the need for the contracting officer to seek 
maximum practicable competition and to ensure that the price is fair and 
reasonable.  
(b)(1) The requirements at section 215.371-2 do not apply to small 
business set-asides under FAR subpart 19.5 or set-asides under the 
HUBZone Program (see FAR 19.1305(c)), the Service-Disabled Veteran-
Owned Small Business Procurement Program (see FAR 19.1405(c)), or the 
Woman-Owned Small Business Program (see FAR 19.1505(d)).  
(2) The requirements at section 215.371-3 do apply to such set-
asides. (DFARS, 2012) 
DFARS subparagraph (b) allows for the contracting officer to request and 
obtain certified cost and pricing data in the event that true competitive forces were 
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relatively recent change to regulation, since it was not part of the original FARA and 
FASA statutes.  As a researcher, I had proposed in 2004 that the government be 
given greater authority to allow for obtaining certified cost and pricing data and/or to 
eliminate the contractor’s unilateral authority to claim commercial item designation 
beyond the FARA and FASA.  This DFARS provision allows for that greater 
sovereign capability and strengthens the contracting officer’s ability to make fair and 
reasonable determinations based on truly competitive market forces,  the preferred 
methodology, or via obtaining certified cost or pricing data and subsequent analysis 
and negotiations.   
F. Does the Should-Cost Initiative Conflict With Commercial 
Item Acquisition Provisions Under the FARA and FASA?  
As my analysis indicates, the newest provisions of DFARS 215 related to cost 
and pricing data have corrected one of the greatest potential problems of 
commercial item acquisition provisions -- the FARA and FASA prohibition against 
obtaining certified cost and pricing data needed for analysis and negotiation of 
contract actions in non-competitive marketplaces.   
Mr. Elliott Branch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition Policy 
ASN(AP), and Mr. Charlie Williams, Director of the DCMA, indicated during 
interviews for this research conducted in August 2012, that the current policies on 
commercial item acquisition under the FARA and FASA do not pose a big concern 
for the should-cost initiative.  With the recent DFARS 215-317 allowance for 
inadequate competition and the invocation of certified cost and pricing data 
capabilities under the TINA, the government has asserted its capability to get the 
information necessary to conduct sound cost element and price analysis that is 
needed for examining contractor proposals.  These DFARS changes were fully 
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V. Should-Cost Will-Cost Implementation and 
Potential Impacts 
Should-cost initiatives are envisioned to save money within contracts 
immediately being used to buy weapons systems, but, and this is new to the Should-
cost initiative, also within the conduct and structure of the program offices and the 
contractor’s business units actually producing the weapons systems.  In this section, 
I present results from research, interviews, and analysis on whether the DoD is 
properly structured to adequately achieve the tenets of the Ashton Carter initiative.  I 
also reiterate the pilot programs for should-cost, along with an analysis of the 
personnel, platforms, and protocols that are, or will be, required for efficiently 
conducting and capitalizing on should-cost initiatives.  Since the initiative is relatively 
new and there is only a limited amount of published data specific to the personnel, 
platforms, and protocols, I have conducted interviews with key senior leaders 
identified as having a crucial role in implementing and executing the should-cost 
initiative.  These interviews included, but were not limited to, the following: 
 Mr. Shay Assad, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisition 
Technology, and Logistics, DPAP, Director of Defense Pricing, 
Tuesday, August 7, 2012. (Assad, 2012); 
 Mr. Elliott Branch, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research 
Development and Acquisition, Acquisition Policy, Thursday, August 9, 
and Friday, August 24, 2012. (Branch, 2012a, 2012b); 
 CAPT Scott Hoffman, Director, Contracting (Code 2.0), U.S. Naval 
Space Warfare Command (SPAWAR), Thursday, August 9, 2012. 
(Hoffman, 2012); 
 Mr. Charlie Williams, Director, Defense Contract Management Agency 
(DCMA), Tuesday, August 14, 2012; and 
 Mr. Walt Brown, Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) Head of 
Contracting Agency (HCA) Policy Directorate, Wednesday, August 1, 
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I conducted additional interviews with contracting officers, contract specialists 
and program office personnel, and representatives from the DCMA and DCAA 
commands and field offices.  These personnel wished not to be quoted directly, in 
most cases because of concerns that statements may not be in exact harmony with 
current policy initiatives or may be viewed negatively.  The number of those 
expressing concerns over anonymity was small relative to the number contacted, but 
I’ve chosen not to identify them for Institutional Review Board compliance and to 
maintain the confidentiality of the interviewees.  
A. Programs Initially Covered by Ashton Carter’s Should-Cost 
Initiative 
The implementation of will-cost and should-cost management initiatives was 
targeted at five ACAT I–III programs equally allocated in the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force.  The five programs vary in their current maturity and milestone attainments. 
Specifically, the programs are reiterated in Table 7. 
Table 7. Should-Cost Management Example (Pilot) Programs 
 
Air Force Army Navy 
Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) Joint Air Ground Missile 
(JAGM) 
Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) 
Global Hawk Blocks 30 & 
40 (GH BLK 30 & 40) 
Black Hawk (UH-60M) Hawkeye (E-2D) 
Space Based Infrared 
System (SBIRS) 
Ground Combat Vehicle 
(GCV) 
Presidential Helo (VXX) 
Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle (EELV) 
Paladin Product 
Improvement (PIM) 
Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS) 
Advanced Extremely 
High Frequency (AEHF) 
Satellite System 
NETT Warrior Ohio Replacement 
Program 
Note. The information in this table was adapted from the Implementation of Will-Cost and Should Cost 
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B. Program and Contract Examination for Greater 
Efficiencies 
According to Ashton Carter’s Implementation of Will-Cost and Should-Cost 
Management memorandum, dated April 22, 2011, (see Appendix F for the complete 
memorandum) and based on interviews with senior leaders and policy-makers, 
should-cost management is now much broader in scope and methodology than that 
which is defined in FAR Part 15 and DFARS Part 215.  Mr. Elliott Branch, Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN[RD&A]), 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition Policy (DASN AP), stated 
during an interview for this project that the name should-cost is a misnomer for this 
initiative.  The reason is that most seasoned professionals view should-cost  in terms 
of FAR Part 15 and DFARS 215, but in fact, the current initiative encompasses much 
more scope and breadth than the traditional definition (Branch, 2012b).  According to 
Ashton Carter’s April 22, 2011, memorandum and other implementation guidance, 
the current initiative spans program, contract and contractor business unit, and 
contracting offices, as iterated in the following, as examples from the April 22, 2011, 
memorandum:  
1. Scrutinize each contributing ingredient of program and cost and justify 
it.  Why is it reported or negotiated. What reasonable measures might 
reduce it?  
2. Particularly challenge the basis for indirect cost in contractor 
proposals.   
3. Track recent program cost, schedule, and performance trends and 
identify ways to reverse negative trends.  
4. Benchmark against similar DoD programs and commercial analogues 
(where possible), and against other programs performed by the same 
contractor or in the same facilities. 
5. Promote Supply Chain Management to encourage competition and 
incentivize cost performance at lower tiers. 
6. Reconstruct the program (government and contractor) team to be more 
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7. Identify opportunities to breakout Government-Furnished versus Prime 
contractor-provided items. 
8. Indentify items or services contracted through a second or third party 
vehicle. Eliminate unnecessary pass-through costs by considering 
other contracting options.  
9. In the area of test:  
a.  Take full advantage of integrated Developmental and 
Operational Testing (DOT) to reduce overall cost of testing; 
b.  Integrate modeling and simulation into the test construct to 
reduce overall costs and ensure optimal use of National test 
facilities and ranges.  
10. Identify and alternative technology/material that can potentially reduce 
development or life cycle costs for a program.  Ensure the prime 
product contract includes the development of this technology/material 
at the right time. (Carter, 2011b) 
While FAR Part 15 and DFARS 215 primarily address means to capture 
reductions in overhead (OH and G&A), Dr. Carter’s initiative has expanded FAR and 
DFARS conceptually to include all aspects that can drive cost into a weapons 
systems acquisition—encompassing, but clearly not limited to, program, contract, 
operations and production, and test and evaluation, to name a few.   
Elliott Branch, indicated that based on the scope of the new initiative that 
Ashton Carter picked the wrong name, stated that the name should be cost 
consciousness and not should-cost.  Cost consciousness, considering all business 
activity and decisions that may drive cost, includes much more than traditional 
should-cost, and using a new name could alleviate misperceptions among the 1102 
series contract specialists and other stakeholders that this initiative is solely a 
revitalization of a rather dormant provision of the FAR and DFARS that was already 
in existence.  “Contracting Officers are used to seeing should cost in the FAR.  It 
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Traditional FAR- and DFARS-driven should-cost is represented in Figure 5, 
wherein contracting was the primary focus of the protocol.  Dr. Carter’s should-cost 
initiative encompasses more than what was traditionally done under the existing 
FAR and DFARS protocols and is represented in Figure 6, with some of the myriad 
management and functional protocols that may be included within the contracting, 
program, and contractor spheres.    
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Figure 6. Should-Cost Cost Consciousness in Dr. Carter’s Initiative 
(Yoder, 2012) 
C. Is There a Potential or Actual Conflict Between the 
Current Initiative and the FARA and FASA?    
Prior sections in this report indicated potential negative effects that a 
commercial item acquisition mandates under the FARA and FASA, as implemented 
for federal contracting in FAR Part 12.  The contracting officer’s ability to determine 
fairness and reasonableness, a mandate for all contract actions regardless of price, 
may be negatively impacted in instances where adequate competition is not 
manifest on the instant contract action and yet protocols for acquiring commercial 
items are followed.  The commercial item protocols eliminate the ability to obtain 
certified cost and pricing data, an often necessary element of sound pre-negotiation 
analysis, contract negotiation, and the ability to hold contractors accountable for the 
information they provide in response to requests for proposals.  Without certified 
cost and pricing information in these limited, competitive, commercial item 
acquisition protocol buys, the contracting officer is relegated to utilizing second-tier 
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During interviews for this research with senior officials including Shay Assad, 
Charlie Williams, and Mr. Elliott Branch, the apparent conflict between the ability to 
obtain information and commercial protocols are not as manifest as they may have 
been years ago when the FARA and FASA were first implemented.  First, recent 
changes to DFARS Part 215 Section 4 (DFARS 215-400 series presented below) 
now allow for a review of the determination of fairness and reasonableness at a level 
above the contracting officer in instances where truly adequate competition is not 
achievable.  
215.371-3 Fair and reasonable price. 
 (a) If there was “reasonable expectation …that two or more offerors, 
competing independently, would submit priced offers” but only one offer is 
received, this circumstance does not constitute adequate price competition 
unless an official at one level above the contracting officer approves the 
determination that the price is reasonable (see FAR 15.403-1(c)(1)(ii)). 
(b)  Except as provided in section 215.371-4(a), if only one offer is 
received when competitive procedures were used and the solicitation allowed 
at least 30 days for receipt of proposals (unless the 30-day requirement is not 
applicable in accordance with 215.371-4(b) or has been waived in 
accordance with section 215.371-5), the contracting officer shall— 
(1) Determine through cost or price analysis that the offered 
price is fair and reasonable and that adequate price competition exists (with 
approval of the determination at one level above the contracting officer) or 
another exception to the requirement for certified cost or pricing data applies 
(see FAR 15.403-1(c) and 15.403-4). In these circumstances, no further cost 
or pricing data is required; or 
 (2)(i) Obtain from the offeror cost or pricing data necessary to 
determine a fair and reasonable price and comply with the requirement for 
certified cost or pricing data at FAR 15.403-4, in accordance with FAR 
provision 52.215-20. For acquisitions that exceed the cost or pricing data 
threshold, if no exception at FAR 15.403-1(c) applies, the cost or pricing data 
shall be certified; and  
(ii) Enter into negotiations with the offeror as necessary 
to establish a fair and reasonable price. The negotiated price should not 
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Although the DFARS provision does provide some relief for contracting 
officers who decide on fairness and reasonableness and whether to award a 
contract, the capability to make the decision will still be based on information that is 
not certified current, accurate, and complete as of the date of agreement on price, as 
is the case under the TINA.   
Mr. Shay Assad does not think that the lack of TINA certified cost and pricing 
data is an issue on major programs.  Notwithstanding the preceding information, Mr. 
Assad stated that most contractors, in his experience (which is well documented), 
are reluctant under any circumstances to provide the government with inaccurate 
information pursuant to a contract proposal or negotiation.  “Contractors are just as 
concerned over a False Claims Act violation as they are for a TINA violation.  
Contractors don’t want to purposefully submit any data that can be construed to be 
false.  There is no incentive for them to do it” (Assad, 2012).    
Additionally, most prospective contractors and actual contractors on the 
current ACAT I–III programs under Dr. Carter’s should-cost initiative have not 
claimed commercial item protocols under FAR Part 12, which prevents hindering the 
contracting officer from requesting or obtaining certified cost or pricing data where 
warranted.   
Conceptually there is, in fact, a conflict, since the FARA and FASA 
commercial item acquisition is mandatory and statutory definitions allow for a broad 
interpretation of what constitutes a commercial item. However, in practice, the DoD 
hasn’t recently utilized commercial item protocols on major weapons systems nor on 
those under the new should-cost initiative.  
D. Is the DoD Structured to Efficiently Implement Should-
Cost?   
 Are PMs, the DCMA, and the DCAA able to fully support the initiatives in 
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What exactly do the terms personnel, platforms, and protocols mean?  
Personnel refers to having the right number and mix of personnel with the right 
credentials and experience that enables them to perform needed functions in DoD 
organizations.  Platforms refers to the systems, including hardware and software 
systems, management information systems, report generation, and visibility to those 
that need them.  Protocols refers to the statutory, regulatory, and business rules and 
processes that guide the DoD through the acquisition and contracting process.  
These three elements—personnel, platforms, and protocols— I first published in 
2007 as the Three Pillars of Integrative Success for contingency contracting 
operations analysis and subsequently successfully utilized by the Air Force for 
analysis of green acquisition initiatives.  In this report, I use this same framework to 
determine if key pillars of success are in place to ensure that Ashton Carter’s 
should-cost initiative is met successfully, and if not, how any deficiencies can be 
addressed.   
1. Personnel: The First Pillar of Integrative Success 
According to Mr. Shay Assad, the should-cost initiative requires integrated 
cost analysis teams (ICAT). ICATs are all the relevant stakeholders and experts in 
cost analysis efforts within a program. In order to effectively implement should-cost, 
program offices must include all relevant stakeholders into ICATs, and the teams 
must be established early in a program, preferably during definition.  FAR Part 15 
calls traditional should-cost teams “Multi-functional Teams (MTs)”; however, this 
terminology has yet to be widely used and should be replaced on a broader scale 
with ICAT.  Within the Navy, ICATs  are being accomplished by establishing 
integration in engineering, program management, and pricing teams—specifically, 
an integration that includes a DCMA partnership with Navy Price Fighters. This 
integration requires a change in the traditional view of what a contracting officer can 
do alone.  It also requires creating revolutions in the DCMA (Assad, 2012). The 
contracting officer must still be the pricing expert because ultimately, the decision to 
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warranted authority at the contracting-officer level.  What’s new is the integration 
across offices and disciplines.   
Shay Assad and Charlie Williams both point to a recent increase in personnel 
at the DCMA, driven in large part to the new should-cost initiative.  The DCMA has 
increased its full-time-equivalent (FTE) workforce by over 350 personnel.  The 
DCAA has increased its FTE by over 700 personnel, with an additional 600-
personnel increased planned for the next five years.  I expressed concern that these 
may be targeted in potential upcoming budget cuts, but both Assad and Williams 
indicated that these positions are necessary to effect future cost savings and not 
subject to potential cuts.  Once trained, these personnel will support the new 
initiatives and should provide a positive return on investment.   
Everyone I interviewed—including Shay Assad, Charlie Williams, Elliott 
Branch, Scott Hoffman, and others—indicated that DoD is not where it needs to be 
from a personnel standpoint.  Although the numbers of personnel, as a whole, are 
increasing, training is being conducted in specific areas needed at the Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU)—and I’ll add at the NPS—and what’s lacking is the 
experiential component.  Auditing in complex environments and interpreting the 
results into actionable items is lacking to some degree.  Additionally, most of the 
individuals I interviewed stated that DoD does not have the right mix of personnel, 
meaning the right balance of skill sets in the inventory.  Elliott Branch stated that we 
need production- and engineering-savvy personnel who can walk into a contractor’s 
plant, examine processes, and make sound recommendations.  In order to do that, 
we need people who have some type of production business acumen—even Lean-
Six-Sigma analysis in production.  It is a discipline that DoD used to have resident in 
systems commands but was lost during the last two decades.  We need to 
reconstitute this capability.  Additionally, we need business literacy—people who 
know how to appropriately allocate business contracts against time and space and 
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In summary, key points extracted from my interviews regarding personnel 
include, but are not limited to, the following: 
 Personnel must be integrated across program, contracting, and other 
disciplines in ICAT. 
 The DCMA has increased by over 350 personnel and is scheduled to 
gain hundreds more, many in roles designed to support the should-
cost initiative.  
 The DCAA has increased by over 700 personnel, with more scheduled 
in the next five years. 
 Training in critical disciplines, cost analysis, CAS, the FAR, and so 
forth is occurring at the DAU.  
 Experience is lacking in the credentials of new hires, and only time on 
the job will rectify this deficiency.  
 Key disciplines are still lacking, particularly in production and 
engineering specialists with skills to translate business changes into 
actionable savings in contract and program cost. 
 Leadership is wholly committed to the should-cost initiative. 
The DoD is getting the personnel pillar in place with the right number and 
right mix of people necessary to affect should-cost savings.  However, there are still 
deficiencies in the total numbers of personnel on board, in experience levels, and in 
specific skill sets.  These deficiencies are well known among senior leaders and 
policy-makers and are being addressed.  It may take a decade to realize the 
changes in the personnel pillar in order  to optimize the should-cost initiative.   
2. Platforms: The Second Pillar of Integrative Success 
Platforms represent the second pillar for success of the should-cost initiative.  
Platforms are the hardware and software systems needed to efficiently capture, 
analyze, and disseminate information necessary to managing critical aspects of 
programs and contracts in support of acquisitions.  There are literally dozens of 
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example, the Standard Procurement System (SPS), also known as the DP2 system, 
is the platform utilized for the conduct of structuring and awarding contract actions.  
The Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) is the platform for collecting, 
maintaining, and disseminating data on contract actions, including identification of 
key parameters of socio-economic data related to contract and modification awards.   
A single platform system for the collection and utilization of data necessary for 
should-cost initiatives did not exist, until recently.  The DCMA has deployed a new 
platform called the Contract Business Analysis Repository, or the CBAR.  This 
platform was established in March 2011 per director of Defense Pricing Mr. Shay 
Assad.  It is designed, primarily, to provide contracting officers with the necessary 
single-point access to key information spanning DoD-wide contracts and relevant 
information required for contracting officers to produce pre-negotiation business 
clearances, sometimes known as business clearance memorandum (BCM). CBAR 
data can be utillized as a pre-cursor to conducting negotiations pursuant to a 
contract award and data for the continued management of contracts with real-time 
actionable information available 24/7 via a secure network.  Although the DCMA and 
DCAA will drive much of the data input, all DoD services and systems commands 
will have CBAR data as well as key roles in populating and managing data in the 
system.   
As of August 2012, the Naval Sea Systems Command, Army Contracting 
Command, Air Armament Center, and Ogden Logistics Center were designated as 
pilot sites to test the system with procurement contracting officers (PCOs), contract 
specialists, buyers, price/cost analysts, and procurement analysts.  According to 
Shay Assad, the CBAR platform can provide instant data to the key players, 
including to the PCO online and in real-time.  Not only will DoD activities have data 
input but also corporations themselves will participate in populating data such as 
actual production data and associated cost.  Naturally, this type of data must be 
strictly controlled to be compliant with confidentiality and proprietary data rights, 
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source-selection sensitive information.  Information will only be accessible for pre-
authorized personnel using contractor commercial and government entity CAGE 
codes to verify need-to-know and precertification within the DoD.  Currently, and as 
planned, data entry for contractor-provided information will be accomplished through 
DCMA personnel in order to validate the data and limit access to the system.  
Detailed policies and procedures for the system are under development and/or 
review.  Users will register via the DCMA External Web Access Management 
(EWAM) system to request CBAR access at the web address 
(http://eadf.dcma.mil/ewam2/registration/setup.do). 
Shay Assad also stated in our interview that “Information must be integrated 
from all sources, creating systems that coordinate and synchronize data with ICAT 
teams. We have never had this capability until now” (Assad, 2012).  
According to Mr. Charlie Williams and DCMA sources, the CBAR will 
incorporate forward pricing rate agreements/recommendations for overhead, G&A, 
and other cost categories in real-time—initially, for major business units associated 
with the should-cost pilot programs, and later, to ACAT I–III program supporting 
contractor business units, along with data from supporting contracting offices, DCMA 
field offices, and the DCAA.  Ideally, the system will capture in real-time all of the 
following for ACAT I–III contractors:  
 forward pricing rate agreements/recommendations; 
 latest contractor business systems; 
 Contractor Purchasing System Review (CPSR) data, deficiencies, and 
corrective action plans (if warranted); 
 company data including but not limited to 
o cash flow, 
o profit and/or fee, and 
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 results of recent contract negotiations (business clearance versus 
actual negotiation results); 
 etc.  
Note that the contractor and the PCO, among others, must load the data into 
the CBAR system.  As in any system, managing and updating the data and having it 
stored in a readily accessible manner will be the key to successful deployment of the 
promising system.  
3. Protocols: The Third Pillar of Integrative Success 
Protocols are the statutes, regulations, policies, and business processes that 
allow acquisition to occur while adhering to standardized business rules with 
discretionary freedoms.  Protocol includes statutes such as the FARA, the FASA, the 
TINA, and the Small Business Act; regulations including the FAR, DFARS, and 
service issued regulations; and policies such as the should-cost will-cost policy 
issued by Ashton Carter.  The statutory, regulatory, and policy protocol hierarchy 
must work in harmony.   
The protocols for the should-cost initiative are specifically structured to allow 
for the greatest flexibility in execution by the program and contracting offices and by 
the business units doing business with the government.  The senior leadership 
interviewed for this project supported the concept of having flexibility at the program 
office for determining the types of events and targets that will best serve the 
interests of the government, based on the unique circumstances of each program.  
To paraphrase a senior program office manager, “This is much better than a one 
size fits all approach.  Those usually don’t take into account specific criteria that may 
be best for a particular situation.”    
On the downside, most senior leaders, including Elliott Branch and Charlie 
Williams, expressed concerns over the name of this initiative.  Should-cost is most 
often associated with the FAR 15 and DFARS 215 contracting specific regulations.  
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in acquisition.  Traditional FAR and DFARS should-cost reviews are defined and 
described as a special form of cost analysis done in support of contract negotiation.  
The FAR 15 should-cost is unique, however; it differs from traditional evaluation 
methods because traditional methods do not assume that a contractor’s historical 
cost reflect efficient and economic operation.  These reviews evaluate the economy 
and efficiency of the contractor’s existing work force, materials, methods, equipment, 
real property, operating systems, and management (Boito, Brancato, Cook, & 
Graser, 2012).  
But, Ashton Carter’s initiative is more than the traditional FAR and DFARS 
protocol. The initiative should be called cost consciousness.   
The FAR and DFARS protocols include many business disciplines across a 
large spectrum.  Figure 6 is represented as Figure 7 shows the broader scope of 
Ashton Carter’s should-cost  will-cost initiative.  
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In order to effectively implement should-cost, program offices must include all 
relevant stakeholders in should-cost into task-specific integrated process teams 
(IPTs), and the teams must be established early.  FAR Part 15 calls these teams 
“Multi-functional Teams (MTs)”; however, this terminology has yet to be broadly 
used.  These teams should be structured, as Mr. Shay Assad states, as ICATs in 
order to meet the broader definition and scope of the initiative.   
Mr. Elliott Branch and CAPT Scott Hoffman both expressed the need to have 
the protocols in place in the development and specification writing stages, long 
before the first milestone.  The early design requirements drive future production 
parameters and cost, many of which, once established, cannot be changed without 
introducing additional cost and/or delays in the program.  Hoffman was adamant that 
earlier PM involvement in specification writing, and getting it correct, is paramount.  
Once the specification is proffered, it becomes the heart of the contract and governs 
the business relationship.  “The contract is Commander’s business. … [N]ew 
recognition of the importance of the contract is needed” (Hoffman, 2012).  
FAR 15 and DFARS 215 traditional protocols for should-cost at the program 
review level should be conducted under and with the following considerations: 
 some initial production has already taken place; 
 the contract will be awarded on a sole-source basis; 
 there are future-year production requirements for substantial quantities 
of like items;  
 the items being acquired have a history of increasing cost;  
 the work is sufficiently defined to permit an effective analysis, and 
major changes are unlikely;  
 sufficient time is available to plan and adequately conduct the should-
cost review; and  
 personnel with the required skills are available or can be assigned for 
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In the broader definition of should-cost, the concepts are implemented across 
a longer time horizon and the protocols are used cyclically and continually to identify 
and extract value and savings to all the parties, government and contractor.  The 
broader-scope should-cost initiative protocol can be distilled into seven identified 
phases. Figure 8 presents these seven phases.   
  
Figure 8. The Seven Phases of Should-Cost Protocol 
(Yoder, 2012) 
Of particular note is that much of the official published information on should-
cost does identify the “what” that should be done—only the interviews and personal 
managerial experience identified the Phase 6 protocol, Incorporate Should-Cost 
Action into Business, PM and Contract Actions – as Required – in course of action 
(COA) Implementation Plan.  Phase 6 is the “how” protocol that will require 
managerial expertise to time-phase specific identified actions into the business 
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For example, if a should-cost COA or target calls for a revision of manufacturing 
processes to gain efficiencies, any actual gains must then be reflected in a realizable 
savings to the government.  Most often, the mechanism to capture savings—if 
actually achieved from the revision of manufacturing processes—is through the 
protocols for realizing such savings by the contract vehicle itself.  Most contracting 
officers I interviewed recognized this, although some PM personnel were not as 
convinced that the contract itself was the means to capture the savings.  If not in the 
contract, then how will that savings be captured?   
During the execution of this research, when given the example discussed 
previously in the manufacturing process example, many PMs and PM office 
personnel expressed that lower overhead rates would result from the changes on 
manufacturing processes, although, they were uncertain as to how those would be 
reflected in actual savings.  However, as contracting officers and I contend, the 
lower rates from the example can only be realized if and only if the contract type and 
structure is designed to capture those savings!   
The should-cost protocols must encompass all ICAT stakeholders, including 
contracting, to be successful.  Do not underestimate the role that a well-integrated 
contracting team will play in the efficacy and viability of the should-cost initiative.  
In conclusion, the integrated pillars for success—personnel, platforms, and 
protocols—must be in place to fully realize the potential of the Ashton Carter should-
cost initiative.  Weaknesses in any or all of the pillars will have adverse effects on 
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VI. Summary, Conclusions, and 
Recommendations 
Ashton Carter, and those following him, are committed to achieving cost 
savings in our weapons systems acquisitions.  The should-cost initiative is a 
mechanism to deal with escalating cost in market places that are increasingly 
characterized by limited or not true competition among manufacturers.   
I designed this research to answer several primary questions, which are 
presented in the following section along with their associated answers.  Also in the 
following section, I identify and propose many areas for further research.   
A. Summary of Questions and Concise Research Findings 
I address and answer the following questions pursuant to this research.   
Question 1: What specific impact does Ashton Carter’s should-cost 
initiative have on DoD contracting as related to commercial item protocols?  
The FASA and the FARA created a preference for protocols for acquiring 
commercial items, which are now mandatory for use, statutorily and under FAR Part 
12.  The concern is that some data that PMs and contracting offices may want or 
need may not due to data and audit limitations imposed under protocols for acquiring 
commercial items, such as loss of the capability to obtain certified cost and pricing 
data under the TINA.    
Senior leaders in acquisition and contracting are not concerned about the 
potential loss of capability, in that there are recent provisions and legislative changes 
in progress that will lessen the applicability of the FARA and FASA and of FAR Part 
12 protocols in circumstances where the acquisition is limited by no true competition 
in the marketplace.  Revisions for the applicability of commercial protocol in 
acquisitions where there is limited or no competition, is a potential change, which I 
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changes in the applicability of the FARA and FASA, a contract strategy can be 
implemented by PMs and contracting officers that allows for a shift from cost 
reimbursement contracts, normally utilized early in pre-production and low-rate-
production phases, to fixed-priced vehicles once cost data becomes available, 
usually at or just after (LRIP) occurs.  A preferred strategy is utilizing fixed-price 
incentive contracts and specific clause and provision contract language to ensure 
that the should-cost savings realized can and will be captured in whole or in part by 
the contract vehicle.  I cannot emphasize enough that unless the should-cost 
savings is captured, it really is not a realized savings.  The legal relationship and 
capabilities of the government and contractor are defined in and by the contract; the 
capability must be built into the language and structure of the contract.  At this time, 
the best overarching vehicle to accomplish the savings at or after LRIP is through a 
fixed-priced-incentive-fee (FPIF) or similar vehicle.  Note that this research is not 
intended to explore the FPIF or other vehicles.  Those wanting more details on 
contract types can explore numerous publications on the topic.  
This does not mean that there is no conflict between the FARA and FASA 
and the should-cost initiative; there is.  However, it is how we deal with the conflict, 
via the previously discussed strategy, that determines the magnitude of the conflict 
and potential capability to obtain information that will ultimately be used in contract 
negotiations or administration to affect and realize savings.  DoD can and should 
chart an acquisition strategy that will allow for the transition to fixed-priced contract 
types during full production, and we can still capture emerging realized savings with 
the FPIF.  A senior official I interviewed who wished not to be specifically identified 
on this particular issue states that senior leaders in DoD acquisition are working with 
legislators to eliminate the broad definition of commercial item that is expressed in 
the FARA and FASA—and that has caused the conflict and dilemma on major 
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Question 2: What are the data requirement provisions under commercial 
item acquisition protocols versus protocols for acquiring non-commercial 
items?  
The data requirement provisions are based primarily on the statutory and 
regulatory provisions of the FARA and FASA, and FAR Part 12.  These provisions 
eliminate the applicability of the TINA provisions requiring contractors to provide 
certified cost and pricing data on negotiated contracts and modifications exceeding 
established monetary thresholds.  The TINA provisions also precluded DCMA and 
DCAA some audit rights on commercial item acquisitions.   
The potential loss of audits and cost analysis on contracts transitioning to 
FAR Part 12 commercial item acquisition fixed-priced contracts, as is mandated 
under the FARA and FASA by definition, could impair if not outright preclude key 
mechanisms and protocols needed for the should-cost initiative. As an example, a 
loss of capability could include the DCMA (1) making recommendations for process 
improvements and conducting audits to determine actual cost savings incurred at a 
contractor’s business unit but (2) not having the authority to review contractors’ 
actual records pursuant to a formal should-cost audit under FAR Part 15 and 
DFARS Part 215.   
An alternative strategy and FPIF-type contracts, along with defined audit 
rights under FAR Part 15 and DFARS Part 215, should be utilized by DoD on ACAT 
I-II programs to ensure that any potential loss of data examination is removed or 
mitigated.  Ultimately, a revision to the FARA and FASA application to major 
weapons systems in quasi-competitive and non-competitive markets must be 
enacted by Congress and incorporated into the FAR to eliminate any loss of 
government capability and remove any potential conflict in data and audit rights. 
Question 3: Is the should-cost requirement approach, as defined in the 
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the FARA and the FASA, or does the memorandum call for another acquisition 
strategy using protocols for acquiring non-commercial items?   
 And Question 4: If the should-cost memoranda initiatives are to be 
achieved, what specific actions and strategies must contracting offices take to 
support the mandate? 
Questions 3 and 4 are similar and answered by the response to question 2, 
above and in the following. 
In essence, without a legislative change that closes the broad definition of 
commercial item, the PM and contracting strategy must call for an integration of 
review and audit rights defined in the contracts at or near Milestone B and/or LRIP.  
Normally, the FARA and FASA would assume a strategy of morphing to a FAR Part 
12 commercial contract at milestone B.  This can still be accomplished if warranted 
and in the best interests of the government.  However, if more data and audit 
capability are needed for the realization of should-cost target attainment, then FAR 
Part 15 and subsequent deeper audit capability, along with other provisions such as 
the TINA, may be more appropriate.  These decisions must be iterated within each 
acquisition and associated contract strategy and as part of milestone review.  The 
ICAT must be in place to help make these decisions, although the PCO, with warrant 
authority, will ultimately decide on contract type and execution.   
Question 5: Are the DCMA and DCAA able to fully support this initiative, 
and what specific actions must they take?  
It is important to point out that a balanced analytical framework was utilized to 
help answer this question.  The three pillars of integrative success—personnel, 
platforms, and protocols—all must be structured and work in harmony in order to 
have any major policy success.    
Both the DCMA and DCAA are in the long-term process of recapitalizing their 
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Williams and Mr. Elliott Branch stated in my interviews with them, it is not enough to 
have the people—credentialed people with experience are the key.  New personnel 
hires are getting state-of-the-art training and education—from the DAU and NPS—
but the experience component is not something that can be attained in the 
classroom.  The recapitalization will take years and is currently part of the strategies 
at these organizations.   
The platforms are being established by DoD, including DCMA, particularly 
including CBAR—the brand new integrated system that will capture essential data 
needed for sound business analysis and contract negotiations and that is specifically 
targeted for should-cost initiatives.  The challenge will be to ensure that the data is in 
a useful and readily retrievable format and is managed for currency and relativity—
no small task.  Since the system is just now being fielded and will take a few years to 
fully populate with essential data, contractors and government personnel are 
required to input data, a function that can and should be defined and monitored by 
the ICATs and managed to a large degree by the DCMA.   
The should-cost protocols are in place, albeit with a potential conflict with the 
FARA and FASA, but the potential conflict may be mitigated by PMs and PCOs 
when the correct strategy is selected, based on specific should-cost targets and the 
need for information derived from non-commercial versus commercial contract 
strategies.  The DCMA and DCAA can work within the overarching strategy and 
provisions allowed via specific contract language and protocol, whether in FAR Part 
12 or FAR Part 15.  Specific protocols for optimizing should-cost can best be 
identified early in the strategy development and should be reviewed at each 
milestone or when business conditions warrant.  The basic seven-step protocol I’ve 
identified through literature and interview analysis may be used as a template. This 
protocol includes integrating contracting protocols with the ICAT developed should-
cost initiatives for each specific program and contracting strategy.  
So, are the DCMA and DCAA ready to implement the should-cost initiative?  
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Question 6: What specific findings and recommendations can be 
proffered to effectively implement the should-cost initiative?   
I make the following findings and recommendations pursuant to the results of 
this research.  
 Finding #1 FARA and FASA 
There is a conflict in the specific definition of commercial item 
acquisition that allows for major weapons systems procurements in 
limited- or non-competitive marketplaces to be characterized as 
commercial under FARA and FASA statutes.  However, any potential 
negative effect of this conflict is mitigated by current policies that call 
for advanced approval of commercial item acquisition strategies on 
weapons systems procurements to ensure that adequate competition 
can be met.   
 Recommendation #1 FARA and FASA 
Legislation must be introduced and passed to revise the FARA and 
FASA definitions of what qualifies as a commercial good or service, to 
include phrases such as “must have demonstrable track record of 
recent sales in the commercial marketplace and/or to the general 
public.”  Several senior leaders interviewed during the execution of this 
research support this recommendation but wished not to be cited 
directly, since there are current efforts to change the statutory 
language.  
 Finding #2: Personnel 
The DCMA, the DCAA, and the Services have made, and are 
continuing to make, significant progress at re-capitalizing their 
workforce with credentialed personnel in key functional specialties 
needed to support the should-cost initiative.  Key functional specialties 
include, but are not limited to, auditors and production specialists, with 
additional specialties in Lean Six Sigma, process management, and so 
forth.  
 Recommendation #2: Personnel 
With the advent of impending budget cuts and potential austerity 
measures, the additional increases in personnel and future hires may 
be targets for freeze or reduction.  The personnel increases must be 
protected against any potential cuts to ensure that cost consciousness 
and reduction in systems acquisition cost can mature and flourish—
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 Finding #3: Platforms  
The CBAR data system has recently been deployed by DCMA.  This 
system is designed for the capture, dissemination, and analysis of 
meaningful cost and pricing, production, corporate operations, and 
other data essential for should-cost efforts and the support of contract 
business case development and negotiations. This platform was 
established in March 2011 per Director of Defense Pricing Shay 
Assad.  It is designed, primarily, to provide contracting officers with the 
necessary single-point access to key information spanning DoD-wide 
contracts and relevant information required for contracting officers to 
produce pre-negotiation business clearances, sometimes known as 
business clearance memorandum (BCM), as a pre-cursor to 
conducting negotiations pursuant to a contract award, and data for the 
continued management of contracts with real-time actionable 
information available 24/7 via a secure network.  Although the DCMA 
and DCAA will drive much of the data input, all DoD services and 
systems commands will have it, and have key roles in populating and 
managing data in the system. 
 Recommendation #3: Platforms  
The CBAR system must be funded to maintain accurate and recent 
data.  The data must be relevant and germane to the should-cost 
effort, which will take quality personnel to define, collect, and populate.  
Continued management and maintenance of this system is imperative 
and must have high-level support.   
 Finding #4: Protocols  
Notwithstanding the FARA and FASA findings and recommendations 
mentioned previously, the protocols for should-cost analysis have been 
promulgated with an emphasis on flexibility.  This flexibility allows 
program offices the highest degree of latitude in determining should-
cost targets and how to achieved those targets.  Flexibility is a huge 
plus, according to senior leaders I interviewed pursuant to this 
research.  As one official noted, “This approach is much better than 
ramming a ‘one size fits all’ mandate on the program and contracting 
offices.”  The tailored approach will allow for exploration of savings 
potentials unique to the business units, contracts, and program office 
objectives.  The results, according to should-cost memoranda, will be 
kept close-hold for internal use only—because some of the data may 
be considered contractor proprietary under the Federal Procurement 
Integrity Act provisions.  However, that information may be shared 
within the government for future target savings and contract 
negotiations.   
 Recommendation #4: Protocols  
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developing its individual targets.  Share information, internally, with 
other program and contracting offices via the CBAR.   
 Finding #5: Should-Cost Target Savings Holdback  
The should-cost initiative calls for withholding from each should-cost 
germane acquisition program, the difference, or delta, between the will-
cost baseline and the should-cost target.  The idea is that this captured 
savings, once realized, can be utilized by DoD, to buy more weapons 
within the program, provide for system upgrades, or be re-programmed 
for other uses.  The amount of holdback is not for external 
dissemination, according to should-cost memoranda.  Many senior 
practitioners in program, budget and finance, and contracting are 
skeptical about this holdback idea—there is expressed concern that if 
not managed properly, holdback funds may be re-allocated for 
purposes other than improvements in the immediate weapons systems 
acquisition, thus creating a huge disincentive for program offices to set 
aggressive should-cost targets.  It is too early in the initiative to 
determine whether or not holdback funds are actually being applied to 
PM improvements and additional weapons systems, or being re-
allocated for other purposes outside of the PM.  
 Recommendation #5: Should-Cost Target Savings Holdback  
Senior leaders must provide incentives for the program offices to set 
aggressive should-cost targets, wherein the will-cost versus should-
cost potential savings have a guaranteed amount or percentage, I’ll 
call it a cost savings incentive (CSI), that can be used for program 
purposes and objectives.  The program office can utilize the CSI 
amount, which perhaps represents either the entire or a portion of the 
total delta. Of course, appropriate approval and statutory provisions 
respecting appropriation and authorization, for additional weapons, 
additional improvements, and local initiatives that will act as incentives 
for continued efforts at improving operations must be addressed.  
 Finding #6: Metrics and Determining Success 
Senior leaders I interviewed agree that meaningful metrics to 
determine the efficacy of the should-cost initiative are needed by 
Milestone authorities, PMs and PCOs , although these metrics have 
yet to be developed and universally promulgated.  
 Recommendation #6: Metrics and Determining Success 
Sound metrics for cost-reductions, efficiency gains and such, must be 
developed and implemented to determine the efficacy of the should-
cost initiative.  At a minimum, an ROI can be developed and utilized, 
capturing DoD’s total loaded labor cost to conduct the should-cost 
efforts, including organic and contractor personnel dedicated to the 
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a similar rough order of magnitude (ROM) metric for many of its 
initiatives.  For example, one DCMA metric determined that for each 
dollar of audit and management capability expended, $6 were either 
recovered or avoided as contract expenditures—an ROI of 1:6.  Other 
metrics I recommend include continued examination of the three pillars 
of personnel, platforms, and protocols against the derived capability or 
utility they provide.  Another metric I recommend is determining 
potential cost savings from commercial item acquisition protocol 
strategy versus the cost of should-cost implementation and use of non-
commercial acquisition protocol strategy, and of course, actual savings 
to date.   
B. Areas for Additional Research 
This research was limited in scope to the specific areas posed in the research 
questions and the areas closely related to those questions.  However, many 
additional areas for research have become apparent  from the interviews and 
analysis of this research.  Some of the prominent areas for further research are the 
following: 
 Determine best methodologies for use of captured target savings and 
means to incentivize program and contracting offices to set and meet 
aggressive savings targets.   
 Identify and promulgate the best metrics for the should-cost initiative, 
to include program, contracting, and business-unit-centric measures.   
 Provide DCMA and DCAA research support in personnel credential, 
training, and retention for long-range recapitalization objectives.  
 Conduct a detailed analysis of the should-cost pilot programs’ actual 
will-cost and should-cost target savings and means by which those 
savings are captured, such as production improvements, Lean Six 
Sigma initiatives, and so forth.  This could be on a program-by-
program basis or by Service for scope and magnitude considerations.   
C. Final Thoughts and Conclusion 
Through this research project, I have determined that there is a conflict in 
statutory and regulatory provisions defining commercial items that could potentially 
have a negative impact on the DoD’s ability to implement some should-cost cost 
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under non-commercial negotiated contracts.  The actual impact of the conflict has 
been minimal, since recent guidance (e.g., DFARS 215) calls for higher approval for 
commercial item acquisition strategies.  Notwithstanding, FARA and FASA statutes 
take precedence, and as such, the statutory language should be revised to tighten 
the definition of commercial item to those goods and/or services that have a recent 
track record of sales in commercial markets and/or to the general public.   
Ashton Carter’s should-cost initiative is a very promising and potentially 
sound means to capture real savings on major weapons systems acquisitions, 
particularly when business units providing production and services operate in quasi- 
or non-competitive markets.  The should-cost initiative is a long-term endeavor that 
must have continued leadership and support, both managerially and financially.  The 
true benefits of the initiative, perhaps defined as an ROI, may not be realized for 
years to come, but the effort is surely needed and, if nurtured properly, should 
succeed.   
Surprisingly, in his September 5, 2012, Defense News report, Zachary Fryer-
Biggs quoted USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall’s ComDef 2012 conference speech in 
which Kendall made the following statement:  
[A] new version of the Pentagon’s Better Buying Power, with some of the 
tenets as the original[,] … [w]ill be rolling out shortly.  We’ve learned from the 
experience of the last couple of years that some of those things worked very 
well, some of them have not turned out to be all that productive, others have 
been difficult to implement.”  He continued, “I think that nothing, nothing, 
works better than competition to drive cost down. As long as we have 
competition, we will be better off. (as cited in Fryer-Biggs, 2012)  
However, as I have clearly presented in this research, many of our major 
weapons systems providers operate in non-competitive environments.  Sans 
increasing the industrial base, the best approach is a continued push with the 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 75 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
List of References  
Assad, S. (2011a, January 4).  Better buying power: Guidance for obtaining greater 
efficiency and productivity in defense spending; “Align Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA) and Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) 
Processes to Ensure Work is Complementary” Washington, DC: Office of the 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(OSD[AT&L]). 
Assad, S. (2011b, April 1).  Role of Defense Contract Management Agency 
[Memorandum].   Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Acquisition (OASD[A]) and Director of the Defense Procurement 
and Acquisition Policy (DPAP).   
Assad, S. (2012, August 7). Interview by E. C. Yoder [Digital recording]. Naval 
Postgraduate School, Acquisition Research Program, Monterey, CA.   
Boito, M., Brancato, K., Cook, C. R., & Graser, J. C. (2012, February). USAF’s 
experience with should-cost reviews and options to enhance its capability to 
conduct them. Santa Monica, CA. RAND Project Air Force.  
Branch, E. (2012a, August 9). Interview by E. C. Yoder [Digital recording]. Naval 
Postgraduate School, Acquisition Research Program, Monterey, CA.   
Branch, E. (2012b, August 24). Interview by E. C. Yoder [Digital recording]. Naval 
Postgraduate School, Acquisition Research Program, Monterey, CA. 
Carter, A.  (2010a, June 28). Better buying power: Mandate for restoring affordability 
and productivity in defense spending [Memorandum for acquisition 
professionals]. Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]).   
Carter, A.  (2010b, September 14). Better buying power: Guidance for obtaining 
greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending [Memorandum for 
acquisition professionals]. Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]).   
Carter, A. (2010c, September 14). Implementation directive for better buying 
power—Restoring affordability and productivity in defense spending 
[Memorandum]. Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]. 
Carter, A. (2010d, November 3).Implementation directive for better buying power—
Obtaining greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 76 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]).   
Carter, A. (2011b, April 22). Implementation of will-cost and should-cost 
management [Memorandum for acquisition and logistics professionals].  
Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]).   
Carter, A., & Hale, R. F. (2011, April 22). Joint memorandum on savings related to 
“should cost” [Joint memorandum for secretaries of the military departments, 
Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]) and Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer (OUSD[CCFO]). 
Carter, A. (2011c, August 24). Should-cost and affordability [Memorandum for 
defense acquisition and logistics professionals]. Washington, DC: Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(OUSD[AT&L]).   
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). (2011, May). Defense contract 
trends—U.S. Department of Defense contract spending and the supporting 
industrial base. Retrieved from http://www.csis.org  
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). (2012, July). Long-term implications of the 
2013 Future Years Defense Program. Retrieved from 
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43428  
Cooper, D. (2011, May). Should cost management—An overview [Slide 
presentation].  Retrieved from http://www.dau.mil  
Dachepalli, A. (2011, February 15). Implementation of should cost initiatives: 
Procedures and guidelines for a program office [Slide presentation]. Virginia 
Beach, VA: Kalman & Company.   
Davies, R. L., & Woods, R. (2011, February 16). Implementing will-cost & should-
cost management [Slide presentation]. Retrieved from https://acc.dau.mil  
Defense Acquisition University (DAU). (2011b, December 11). Should-cost template 
[Slide presentation]. Retrieved from 
https://dap.dau.mil/policy/Lists/Policy%20Documents/Attachments/3310/Shou
ldCostTemplate_8Dec11.ppt 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU). (2011a, August 25). USD (AT&L) Better 
buying power initiative—Target affordability and control cost growth: Drive 
productivity growth through will cost/should cost management [Slide 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 77 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). (2012, April). Should-cost team reviews. In 
Defense contract audit manual (9-1300 Section 13). Retrieved from 
http://www.dcaa.mil/cam.htm  
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), 48 C.F.R. pt. 215 
(2012). Retrieved from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap//dfars/html/current/tochtml.htm  
Department of Defense (DoD), & Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group (OSD CAIG). (2007, October). Operating and support 
cost-estimating guide. Retrieved from http://www.navair.navy.mil  
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. pts. 12, 15, 42 (2012).  Retrieved 
from https://www.acquisition.gov/far/html/FARTOCP15.html  
Fryer-Biggs, Z. (2012, September 5). New version of Pentagon’s better buying 
power coming “shortly.” Defense News.  Retrieved from 
www.defensenews.com  
General Accounting Office (GAO). (1996, April). Acquisition reform: Efforts to reduce 
the cost to manage and oversee DOD contracts (GAO/NSAID-96-106). 
Washington, DC: Author.  
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2012, March). Defense acquisitions—
Assessments of selected weapon programs (GAO-12-400SP). Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589695.pdf  
Hoffman, S. (2012, August 9). Interview by E. C. Yoder [Digital recording]. Naval 
Postgraduate School, Acquisition Research Program, Monterey, CA. 
Morin, J. M., & Van Buren, D. M. (2011, June 15). Implementation of will-cost and 
should-cost management [Memorandum].  Washington, DC: Offices of the 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) 
and Air Force Service Acquisition Executive. 
Rasor, D. (2011, November). “Should cost” vs. “did cost”: How the military-industrial 




Sablan, M. (2011a, Spring). Agency reestablishing cost and pricing capabilities. 
DCMA Communicator Magazine, 30–32.   
Sablan, M. (2011b, Summer). Assad starts department-wide intelligent business 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 78 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Schwellenbach, N. (2011). DOD identifies 14 “should-cost” and “will-cost” 
demonstration programs. Retrieved from http://www.POGO.org 
Williams, C. (2012, August 14). Interview by E. C. Yoder [Digital recording]. Naval 
Postgraduate School, Acquisition Research Program, Monterey, CA. 
Williams, T. (n.d.). Should-cost analysis [Slide presentation]. Fort Belvoir, VA: 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 79 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Appendix A. FAR 15.407-4 -- Should-Cost  
15.407-4  Should-cost review. 
(a) General. 
(1) Should-cost reviews are a specialized form of cost analysis. Should-cost 
reviews differ from traditional evaluation methods because they do not assume that 
a contractor’s historical cost reflect efficient and economical operation. Instead, 
these reviews evaluate the economy and efficiency of the contractor’s existing work 
force, methods, materials, equipment, real property, operating systems, and 
management. These reviews are accomplished by a multi-functional team of 
Government contracting, contract administration, pricing, audit, and engineering 
representatives. The objective of should-cost reviews is to promote both short and 
long-range improvements in the contractor’s economy and efficiency in order to 
reduce the cost of performance of Government contracts. In addition, by providing 
rationale for any recommendations and quantifying their impact on cost, the 
Government will be better able to develop realistic objectives for negotiation. 
(2) There are two types of should-cost reviews—program should-cost review 
(see paragraph (b) of this subsection) and overhead should-cost review (see 
paragraph (c) of this subsection). These should-cost reviews may be performed 
together or independently. The scope of a should-cost review can range from a 
large-scale review examining the contractor’s entire operation (including plant-wide 
overhead and selected major subcontractors) to a small-scale tailored review 
examining specific portions of a contractor’s operation. 
(b) Program should-cost review. 
(1) A program should-cost review is used to evaluate significant elements of 
direct cost, such as material and labor, and associated indirect cost, usually 
associated with the production of major systems. When a program should-cost 
review is conducted relative to a contractor proposal, a separate audit report on the 
proposal is required. 
(2) A program should-cost review should be considered, particularly in the 
case of a major system acquisition (see Part 34), when— 
(i) Some initial production has already taken place; 
(ii) The contract will be awarded on a sole source basis; 
(iii) There are future year production requirements for substantial quantities 
of like items; 
(iv) The items being acquired have a history of increasing cost; 
(v) The work is sufficiently defined to permit an effective analysis and major 
changes are unlikely; 
(vi) Sufficient time is available to plan and adequately conduct the should-
cost review; and 
(vii) Personnel with the required skills are available or can be assigned for 
the duration of the should-cost review. 
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operation have the greatest potential for cost savings and assign the available 
personnel resources accordingly. The expertise of on-site Government personnel 
should be used, when appropriate. While the particular elements to be analyzed are 
a function of the contract work task, elements such as manufacturing, pricing and 
accounting, management and organization, and subcontract and vendor 
management are normally reviewed in a should-cost review. 
(4) In acquisitions for which a program should-cost review is conducted, a 
separate program should-cost review team report, prepared in accordance with 
agency procedures, is required. The contracting officer shall consider the findings 
and recommendations contained in the program should-cost review team report 
when negotiating the contract price. After completing the negotiation, the contracting 
officer shall provide the ACO a report of any identified uneconomical or inefficient 
practices, together with a report of correction or disposition agreements reached with 
the contractor. The contracting officer shall establish a follow-up plan to monitor the 
correction of the uneconomical or inefficient practices. 
(5) When a program should-cost review is planned, the contracting officer 
should state this fact in the acquisition plan or acquisition plan updates (see 
Subpart 7.1) and in the solicitation. 
(c) Overhead should-cost review. 
(1) An overhead should- cost review is used to evaluate indirect cost, such as 
fringe benefits, shipping and receiving, real property, and equipment, depreciation, 
plant maintenance and security, taxes, and general and administrative activities. It is 
normally used to evaluate and negotiate an FPRA with the contractor. When an 
overhead should-cost review is conducted, a separate audit report is required. 
(2) The following factors should be considered when selecting contractor sites 
for overhead should-cost reviews: 
(i) Dollar amount of Government business. 
(ii) Level of Government participation. 
(iii) Level of noncompetitive Government contracts. 
(iv) Volume of proposal activity. 
(v) Major system or program. 
(vi) Corporate reorganizations, mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers. 
(vii) Other conditions (e.g., changes in accounting systems, management, 
or business activity). 
(3) The objective of the overhead should-cost review is to evaluate significant 
indirect cost elements in-depth, and identify and recommend corrective actions 
regarding inefficient and uneconomical practices. If it is conducted in conjunction 
with a program should-cost review, a separate overhead should-cost review report is 
not required. However, the findings and recommendations of the overhead should-
cost team, or any separate overhead should-cost review report, shall be provided to 
the ACO. The ACO should use this information to form the basis for the Government 
position in negotiating an FPRA with the contractor. The ACO shall establish a 
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Appendix C.  Dr-Carter-Memo-
d20100914acquisitionprocurement 
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Appendix F. Memorandum on Implementation of 
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2003 - 2012 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to 
Shipyard Planning Processes  
 Managing the Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone 
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